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Résumé Exécutif 
 
 A la suite de la conquête Islamique de l’Egypte durant le 7ème siècle, les coptes - 
chrétiens indigènes d’Egypte - ont vécu sous la subjugation de la loi Islamique, qui les a 
considéré comme des citoyens de deuxième classe. Lorsque les gouvernements européens ont 
commencé à intervenir dans la politique de l’Empire ottoman, dont l’Egypte faisait partie, les 
coptes ont vu les pouvoirs européens comme des alliés potentiels qui pouvaient plaider en leur 
faveur avec le gouvernement ottoman en Egypte. Durant le 16ème siècle, plusieurs patriarches 
coptes ont engagé des négociations d’unification avec le Vatican afin de garantir la protection 
des coptes par l’Église Catholique. Même si ces négociations n’ont pas réussit, le fait que les 
patriarches coptes étaient prêts à céder leur autorité montre leur conviction que les chrétiens 
européens représentaient leur meilleure garantie de protection. Cette thèse sera confirmée durant  
les règnes de Mohammed Ali et ses descendants (1805-1952). Durant cette période, 
l’intervention européenne en Egypte a amélioré la condition sociale des coptes et leur a permis 
d’atteindre un haut pouvoir économique et politique.  
 L’expédition d’Egypte par Napoléon et son armée de 1798 à 1801 a eu le plus grand 
impact sur la position sociale des coptes en Egypte.  Napoléon a renversé toutes les lois 
islamiques qui limitaient les droits des coptes et il a même nommé un copte, Jirjis al-Jawhari, 
intendant général d’Egypte. Une première dans l’histoire de l’Egypte où un copte avait une 
position de pouvoir sur une population musulmane. En plus, Napoléon a permis la création d’une 
légion de soldats coptes dans son armée qui l’a aidé à lutter contres les mameloukes. Pour un 
peuple qui n’avait pas le droit pendant plusieurs siècles de porter des armes ou de monter à 
cheval, la création d’une telle légion militaire sous le commandement d’un général copte était 
une amélioration impressionnante. Après le départ de l’armée française de l’Egypte, un soldat 
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ottoman d’origine albanaise, Mohammed Ali, a gouverné l’Egypte en 1805. Ali et ses 
descendants ont essayé de transformer l’Egypte en un pays moderne suivant le modèle européen. 
Pendant cette période, même après la défaite de Napoléon, l’influence européenne est restée très 
forte en Egypte, un développement qui a continué à améliorer la position sociale des coptes.  Les 
coptes ont bénéficié de cette influence européenne de plusieurs manières:  
• Les gouvernements européens ont mis une pression sur le gouvernement égyptien pour 
assurer les droits des chrétiens et pour protéger les institutions religieuses—surtout les 
missions européennes—en Egypte.  
• Les missionnaires protestants et catholiques en Egypte ont créé un système d’éducation 
très puissant qui était plus accessible aux coptes qu’aux musulmans.   
• L’Église Copte a vu les écoles catholiques et protestantes comme des concurrents et a 
pris l’initiative de créer son propre système scolaire.  
• Les coptes avaient un avantage éducationnel comparé aux musulmans grâce aux 
nombreuses écoles missionnaires et coptes. Cet avantage, particulièrement leur 
connaissance de langues étrangères, leur a permis d’accumuler un énorme pouvoir 
économique et une influence culturelle. L’éducation des coptes a permis à leur élite une 
grande participation dans le mouvement nationaliste Egyptien et par la suite dans le 
gouvernement.  
• Les Anglais, qui ont occupé l’Egypte entre 1882 et 1952 ont créé un climat libéral, 
protégeant les libertés de religion et de presse, ce qui a permis aux coptes de mieux 
participer dans le système politique de l’Egypte. Les Anglais se considéraient les 
gardiens des chrétiens d’Egypte et ils plaidaient en leur faveur devant le gouvernement 
égyptien contre toute discrimination religieuse.   
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Le sujet d’intervention européenne dans le Moyen Orient au profit des chrétiens est un sujet 
complexe et controversé mais il est clair que les chrétiens d’orient, les coptes inclus, ont 
bénéficié énormément de l’intervention européenne dans leurs pays.   
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Introduction 
 
 The Egyptian Revolution in 2011 captured the world’s sympathy with images of a 
spontaneous student-led popular revolt against a 30-year old authoritarian regime. While the 
revolution succeeded in overthrowing Hosni Mubarak and undoing the ruling National 
Democratic Party, it also ushered in a year of heightened sectarian tensions against Egyptian 
Christians, with several church burnings in Cairo and Upper Egypt, a bloody military crackdown 
on a Coptic protest in Cairo, and other smaller incidents of deadly sectarian-motivated violence 
in rural villages in southern Egypt.  In fact, by any standard of measurement, 2011 saw the most 
deaths from sectarian incidents in modern Egyptian history, beginning with the church bombing 
in Alexandria on New Year’s Eve that claimed over 20 lives. The spate of violence was a jarring 
sign of the stark regression in modern Egyptian society, which had long prided itself on the 
relative harmony that existed between Christians and Muslims, who share a common culture and 
heritage and a deep attachment to their country.   
Resurgent sectarianism and the January 2012 election of an Islamist supermajority in 
Egypt’s new parliament have brought increasing international attention to issues facing Egypt’s 
beleaguered Coptic Christian minority.  The issue of foreign intervention has become 
particularly contentious. As western governments publicly raise concerns about the status of 
Christians in Egypt and expatriate Copts vocally demand action against to protect their 
coreligionists in Egypt, the Coptic Church and prominent Copts in Egypt go to great lengths to 
denounce any foreign interference in Egyptian affairs.  Indeed, radical Islamists often raise the 
prospect of Copts calling on western governments to intervene in Egyptian affairs for protection 
as evidence of disloyalty on their part.  However, a historical assessment of Christian-Muslim 
relations in Egypt shows that European countries, particularly France, played a prominent role in 
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empowering Christians in Egyptian society. Intervention usually manifested itself subtly in 
European educational influence or European complaints about specific government policies. 
Moreover, since most Coptic complaints in the era under examination were against governments 
of foreign, not Egyptian origin, one can hardly consider such complaints expressions of 
disloyalty to Egypt as a nation.  
This thesis will focus on how European intervention affected all Copts—native Egyptian 
Christians—regardless of their sect. The main reason for this is that the lines between different 
Christian sects in Egypt—Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic—are often blurry as intermarriage 
between the sects is common and one can often find all three sects represented within the same 
family, which makes distinguishing between the sects difficult. Makram Ebeid, for example, 
remained Coptic Orthodox even though his father converted to Protestantism.1 Furthermore, 
many ostensible converts to Protestantism or Catholicism continued to go to an Orthodox church 
for baptisms, weddings, and funerals.2 S.H. Leeder describes the 1913 wedding in Assiut of 
Esther Fanous, scion of a prominent Coptic Protestant family, where both Protestant and 
Orthodox clergy officiated.3 Orthodox Christians make up the vast majority of Copts, and most 
Egyptians, then and now, rarely differentiate between the three sects. Since all Copts generally 
faced a similar social environment, differentiating between the sects is a difficult undertaking 
that would not substantively add to the issue of European intervention in Egypt on behalf of 
Christians.    
 Napoleon entered Egypt in 1798 with the goal of spreading the liberal ideals of the 
French Revolution and quickly decided to overturn the dhimmi laws governing the treatment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Mustafa	  Al-­‐Fiqi,	  “Makram	  Ebeid.”	  The Coptic Encyclopedia. Aziz S. Atiya, ed. NY: Macmillan, 1991. Accessed 
at Claremont Coptic Encyclopedia (http://ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/cce). Accessed on 
March 29, 2012.	  2	  S.S. Hasan. Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. 72.  3	  S.H.	  Leeder.	  "Modern	  Sons	  of	  the	  Pharaohs."	  London:	  Hodder	  and	  Stoughton,	  1918,	  121.	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Jews and Christians under Islamic law. The dhimmi laws limited the rights of Copts and 
relegated them to second-class citizenship. Napoleon’s decision was transformative for 
Christians and ushered in years of continuous progress, which culminated in a golden age of 
prosperity and political power for Copts in the first half of the 20th century—an age that was 
made possible by the actions of European diplomats and educators in Egypt. Throughout the 19th 
century, European powers were willing to use their diplomatic leverage with Egyptian rulers to 
advocate for the rights of Christians while European schools in Egypt, mostly run by Christian 
missionaries, empowered Christians economically by giving them easier access to advanced 
education and foreign language skills.  
 This thesis will begin with a brief historical background of the relationship between 
Egyptian Christians and Muslim rulers under the various Islamic periods and how European 
powers began affecting that relationship once Egypt became a part of the Ottoman Empire. Then, 
I will explore the impact Napoleon’s invasion had on the status of Christians in Egypt, 
particularly his offer for protection to Copts, his promotion of a Copt, Jirjis al-Jawhari, to be 
Chief Steward of Egypt, and his extensive recruitment of Copts to serve in the French 
administration in Egypt and even in his military. Moving into the 19th century, I will cover the 
reign of Mohammad Ali and those of his successors, focusing on his promotion of Copts in the 
civil service and continued pressure from European governments for reforms in the legal 
treatment of Christians in Egypt and the rest of the Ottoman Empire, culminating in the 
Hamayouni Decree of 1856. In the latter part of the 19th century, Catholic and Protestant 
missionaries were expanding the presence of European schools in Egypt, which because of their 
Christian nature were much more accessible to Copts and gave them a tremendous advantage 
over their Muslim compatriots in securing professional employment and accumulating wealth.  
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The competition produced by these Catholic and Protestant missionaries in the 19th century also 
forced the Coptic Orthodox Church to begin building up its own educational infrastructure—
further propelling Copts upward professionally.  The liberalizing influence of European 
education on this new generation of highly educated Copts also ushered an internal reform 
movement within the Church, leading to the formation of a lay council called the Majlis al-Milli 
to supervise the governance of the church’s material affairs.   
By the time Britian occupied Egypt in 1882, there was a vibrant, liberal, and politically 
active Coptic upper class that began moving away from internal communal affairs to play 
important roles in wider Egyptian politics. The thesis will end by focusing on a few prominent, 
European-educated Coptic politicians in early 20th century Egypt who symbolized the “golden 
age” of Coptic power and achievement in modern Egypt, which lasted until the 1952 Free 
Officers coup. Boutros Ghali Pasha is the most prominent Coptic politician in Egyptian history, 
serving as foreign minister for decades before becoming the first Coptic prime minister of Egypt 
in 1908. After World War I, Coptic politicians departed from Ghali’s Anglophile stance and 
became actively involved in Saad Zaghloul’s independence movement through his Wafd party. 
Most major Coptic political figures in Egypt joined the Wafd Party, which soon became the 
dominant political party in Egypt and a vehicle for Copts to achieve full representation in the 
Egyptian government. The major Coptic figures in the party include Wissa Wassef and Makram 
Ebeid, who both completed their university education in France. The latter would go on to serve 
as Secretary-General of the Wafd party and Finance Minister of Egypt under the Mustafa al-
Nahhas administration. The Wafd’s political rivals tried to paint the Wafd as a tool of Coptic 
interests because of the overrepresentation of Copts in its leadership. Eventually, the charge 
would resonate with the Egyptian public, and when, in 1942, Makram Ebeid was passed up for 
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another ministerial promotion because the Wafd was worried about its appearance as a “Coptic” 
party, Ebeid and several other leading Copts decided to leave. Ebeid’s departure from the Wafd, 
which was soon followed by the 1952 coup that ended Egypt’s experiment with liberal 
democracy and led to the emigration of Egypt’s European communities, was the end of real 
political power for the Copts in Egypt.  
 
Historical Background 
 
Christianity arrived in Egypt with the apostle Mark, who wrote his gospel in Alexandria 
in the first century A.D., and quickly became the dominant religion in the country until the 
invasion of Egypt by Muslim tribes from the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th century.  From the 
invasion onward, Egypt became an integral part of a wider Islamic caliphate that encompassed 
the entirety of the Middle East and North Africa. While Egypt remained predominantly Christian 
for several centuries after the initial invasion, a combination of strong social pressure to convert 
to Islam and discriminatory government policies (such as the jizya tax on non-Muslims and 
restrictions on church construction) led to a steady flow of converts from Christianity to Islam. 
By the end of the 10th century A.D., Coptic had been reduced to a mostly liturgical language, 
which many historians view as a sign that Christians no longer constituted a majority of the 
Egyptian population.4 
The treatment of Christians and other religious minorities in Egypt during the years of 
Muslim rule in the Middle Ages varied significantly from ruler to ruler, and particularly from 
dynasty to dynasty. For example, the Fatimids were generally considered to have been more 
tolerant of religious minorities than the Mamelukes who succeeded them in ruling Egypt in the 
13th century. The Mamelukes, who were Sunni Muslim soldiers originally from the Caucausus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Edward Wakin. A Lonely Minority: The Modern Story of Egypt’s Copts. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse.com, Inc., 2000. 
8.	  
	  	   9	  
were so oppressive towards Egypt’s religious minorities that, by some estimates, the Coptic 
population of Egypt decreased by 50% to 66% between the 14th and 17th centuries, a period that 
encompasses most of the Mameluke era and the beginning of Ottoman rule.5 The Ottoman 
conquest of Egypt in 1517 officially ended Mameluke rule, though the mamelukes and their 
descendants still exercised authority in Egypt as beys, and reduced Egypt from its position as the 
center of an Islamic empire to a mere province. In terms of the treatment of religious minorities, 
Ottoman rule was certainly an improvement over Mameluke rule; however, government-
sanctioned discrimination persisted in the Ottoman era, with the severity of the enforcement of 
discriminatory dhimmi laws varying from one sultan to the next. Under Ottoman rule, Christians 
could not build new churches or repair old ones, Christians had no right to bear arms, Christians 
had to show deference to Muslims and were not allowed to ride horses or wear flamboyant 
clothes, non-Muslims were often physically segregated from Muslims and prohibited from 
entering certain public spaces, the jizya tax on Christians continued to be enforced and 
sometimes special extra taxes were levied, and certain Muslim sheikhs would fan anti-Christian 
and anti-Jewish sentiment that resulted in random acts of mob violence.6 
 
Looking Towards Europe 
Egypt and Europe had been intimately connected through commercial and human links 
since ancient times, and particularly during the eras of Ptolemaic and Roman rule in Egypt.  
While trade links continued under Fatimid and Mameluke rule, these links intensified during 
Ottoman rule, as traders took advantage of the “pax ottomana” that linked together both sides of 
the Mediterranean. These renewed links between Egypt and Europe also invited the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Febe Armanious. Coptic Christianity in Ottoman Egypt. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. 16.  6	  Armanious,	  16-­‐18.	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establishment of deeper political relationships between Egypt and the major European powers—
particularly the French and the Austro-Hungarians.  Clearly, the Coptic Church viewed European 
Christians as potential protectors of vulnerable Egyptian Christians, who hitherto had been 
totally dependent on the generosity of Muslim overlords for their security.  In the 16th century, in 
the decades immediately following the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, the Coptic Church entered 
into serious discussions with the Roman Catholic Church for unification of the two churches. 
Patriarch Ghubriyal VII was the first to seriously consider discussions of unification with 
representatives of the Catholic church in 1561, though he ultimately decided against it in order to 
assure local authorities of his loyalty to Egypt and because of his hesitation to concede certain 
Coptic beliefs about the divine nature of Jesus Christ.7  Negotiations were resurrected by 
Yu’annis XIV in the 1580s, and he was on the verge of agreeing to a full unification when he 
was poisoned by opponents of unification in 1585.8 Yu’annis’ successor Ghubriyal VIII again 
came extremely close to a unification agreement, going so far as to address the Catholic vicar as 
“head of the priests of the world” and referring to both churches as “a single fold and a single 
faith.”9 However, the unification was not finalized by the end of Ghubriyal’s reign in 1601, and 
his successor Murqus V ended negotiations for unification, much to the chagrin of pro-union 
Coptic elites in Damietta who unsuccessfully tried to unseat him.  
After negotiations with Ghubriyal ended, the Catholic Church adjusted its activity in 
Egypt from a focus on unification with the Coptic Church to an expansion of missionary 
activities and an effort to convert Copts to Catholicism. Despite the ultimate failure of 
unification negotiations, the churches were extremely close to unification, and the seriousness of 
the negotiations is a testament to how much the Coptic Church valued the possibility of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Armanious,	  44.	  	  8	  Ibid.	  	  9	  Armanious,	  121.	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European protection. That multiple Coptic patriarchs were prepared to acknowledge the primacy 
of the papal authority in Rome after over one thousand years of separation shows that the Coptic 
Church was not satisfied with being dependent on Egyptian Muslims for security and felt that 
affiliation with European Catholics would serve as a reliable source of foreign protection for 
Christians in Egypt. That the Roman Catholic Church was also willing to spend nearly eighty 
years involved in such intense negotiations also shows that there was a deep interest on the part 
of European authorities to get involved in the affairs and protection of Egyptian Christians. The 
themes of European concern for the rights and security of Christians in Egypt and the perception 
of European Christians as potential safeguards of minority rights by Copts in Egypt consistently 
resurfaced in modern Egyptian history even after the end of unification discussions.  
 
Beginnings of a Missionary Presence 
The failure of unification talks led to an invigorated effort by the Catholic Church to 
establish a missionary presence in Egypt. The Catholic missionary presence in the Levant, 
particularly Syria and Lebanon, had already been established and had begun experiencing 
significant success in converting the native Orthodox Christians to Catholicism by the 17th 
century. For example, nearly three quarters of Aleppo’s Orthodox Christians were converted to 
Catholicism.10 The Franciscan order already active in the Middle East had opened a hospice in 
Cairo in the 16th century, with the consent of the Coptic Church, in what was the first permanent 
presence of Catholic missionaries in Egypt. In 1622, the Church in Rome developed the 
“Congregation of the Propaganda Fide” which created a specific program for Middle East 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Armanious,	  119.	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missions to convert the native Christians to Catholicism11. The Congregation of the Propaganda 
Fide would usher in an expansion of the Catholic missionary presence in Egypt. The Capuchins 
opened a mission in Cairo in 1630 and the Reformed Franciscan order entered Egypt on a larger 
scale in 1687 by opening missions in Cairo, Fayyum, Rosetta, and Damietta.12 By the turn of the 
18th century, the Franciscans had expended into Upper Egypt and the Sudan, and the Jesuits had 
also entered Egypt by opening a center in Cairo.13 The Coptic Church was initially receptive to 
the presence of Catholic missions as it viewed the missions as too small and too foreign to pose a 
real threat to the dominance of the Coptic Orthodox Church among Egyptian Christians. The 
Coptic Church allowed the missionaries to learn Arabic and Coptic at Coptic monasteries and 
even to preach in Coptic churches.14 
In addition to the tacit support of the Coptic Church, the missionaries also had the 
backing of European governments, who actively intervened to assure the protection of Catholic 
missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. The Catholic Church received edicts from the Ottoman 
sultan in both 1665 and 1690 assuring that missionaries in Ottoman lands had permission to 
preach freely to native Christians and would be assured the protection of local Ottoman 
authorities. The edicts were secured by the ambassadors of Austria-Hungary and France, 
respectively, in Istanbul.15 In 1699, the Austria-Hungarian Empire became the protector of the 
worldwide activities of the Franciscan mission. Because most Coptic Catholics in Egypt were 
converted to Catholicism by Franciscan missionaries, the government of Austria-Hungary 
viewed itself as the protector of the entire Coptic Catholic community. While the Ottoman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Armanious,	  121,	  because	  of	  Islamic	  laws	  against	  apostasy,	  which	  is	  a	  capital	  offense,	  the	  missionaries	  were	  expressly	  forbidden	  from	  proselytizing	  among	  Muslims,	  and	  their	  security	  was	  contingent	  on	  their	  interactions	  being	  limited	  to	  native	  Christians.	  12	  Ibid.	  	  13	  Armanious,	  122.	  	  14	  Armanious,	  121.	  	  15	  Armanious,	  119.	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government in Egypt would not allow Austria-Hungary to extend citizenship to the Coptic 
Catholics, which would result in their being designated “foreign persons,” the Egyptian 
government did agree to give the Austro-Hungarian government the right to extend protection to 
Coptic Catholics and have the Austro-Hungarian consul in Egypt lobby on their behalf, an 
agreement which would last until World War 1.16 
The first Catholic missions in Egypt found it incredibly difficult to convert the Copts, 
particularly as the Coptic Church began to show its hostility to the missions as they grew in size 
and scope. Eventually, however, the missionaries began to learn the local language and fine-
tuned their conversion practices to specifically target Coptic priests, who were known for their 
lack of education even within the Coptic community, with the expectation that their 
congregations would follow. This strategy began showing limited success, and by 1750, there 
were over one thousand Coptic Catholics in Egypt, a number that would grow more throughout 
the 19th century.17 The Catholic community in Egypt was further bolstered by a massive influx of 
Syrian Catholics into Egypt fleeing persecution by Orthodox Syrian Christians in the early 18th 
century.18 The Syrian Catholics in Egypt found success working as merchants in Egypt’s port 
cities and even worked into positions of financial administration that had previously been 
reserved for Copts and Jews. The Syrian Catholic merchants derived their success from their 
ability to tap into extensive networks of Syrian Catholic traders who dispersed all over the 
Mediterranean to flee the persecution of their Orthodox Christian compatriots. Furthermore, the 
French government gave Syrian Catholics berats, which were documents giving them the status 
of “agents” of the French government and allowing them to pay lower tariffs than other native 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Carter,	  8.	  	  17	  Armanious,	  122.	  	  18	  Armanious,	  21.	  	  
	  	   14	  
merchants.19 The berats were the products of capitulation agreements between the Ottoman 
Empire and certain European powers, allowing them to extend their influence in commercial 
matters within the Ottoman Empire. The biased distribution of the berats – France almost 
exclusively gave these titles to Syrian Catholics—is further evidence of the willingness of 
European governments to intervene in Egyptian and Ottoman affairs on behalf of local Christian 
populations—who were all too happy to receive the support and protection of powerful European 
governments.    
 
Napoleon and the Copts 
The 18th century was a tumultuous century for the Coptic Church as it had to protect its 
flock from an increasing rate of conversions to the Catholic Church while at the same time 
serving as the main interlocutor with the Muslim Ottoman rulers in defending the interests and 
security of Christians in Egypt and assuring local authorities of the loyalty of the Christian 
population. That said, the 18th century was also a period where several Coptic archons, or lay 
leaders, rose to highly influential advisory roles in the Ottoman government, particularly in 
positions related to the country’s finances and tax collection.  In this context, the lack of 
affiliation with foreign European powers distinguished Copts from other religious minorities in 
Egypt and gave them the appearance of “incorruptible confidants to Egypt’s local elites.”20 Copts 
also tended to have higher literacy rates than their Muslim counterparts, and the perception of 
Copts as skilled mathematicians and businessmen complemented their presumed loyalty to the 
Egyptian regime to make them valuable assets as advisors and mubashers to Muslim leaders in 
the 18th century.  While the success of the archons allowed them to accumulate vast personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Armanious,	  21.	  	  20	  Armanious,	  31.	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fortunes—the Jawhari brothers, who handled the finances and properties of Ibrahim Bey, owned 
over 167 properties in Cairo by the end of the century21—and lobby on behalf of Coptic interests 
to Egypt’s higher leaders, the Coptic Church was still in a difficult position of negotiating a 
space for survival between Islamic rule and the threat of Catholic missionaries who were 
increasingly succeeding in converting reform-minded Copts. In light of this difficult balance, the 
historian Otto Meinardus said that “when Napoleon Bonaparte and his [soldiers] disembarked in 
Alexandria on July 1, 1798, the Coptic Church had reached its lowest ebb.”22  
Napoleon’s arrival in Egypt marked a significant turning point for the position of Copts 
in Egyptian society. In addition to viewing Egypt as a prized military asset, Napoleon was also 
culturally interested in Egypt and accompanying him on the Expedition d’Egypte were dozens of 
prominent scientists and anthropologists who were deeply interested in ancient Egyptian history 
and also viewed the Copts with interest as a unique Christian group with deep ties to ancient 
Egypt. On July 30, 1798, within one month of his arrival in Egypt, Napoleon not only kept Jirjis 
Al-Jawhari in charge of Egypt’s finances, but he named Al-Jawhari General Steward for all of 
Egypt, in charge not only of the government’s finances but all of Egypt’s tax collection as well.23 
This was an incredible elevation of the status of Copts in Egypt. Because Napoleon’s military 
unseated the beys who had previously ruled Egypt (and whom Jirjis Al-Jawhari and his brother 
had served as mubasher and adviser), Jirjis Al-Jawhari became the highest-ranked Egyptian 
official in the government of Egypt and reported directly to General Kléber and the French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Armanious,	  31.	  Ibrahim	  Al-­‐Jawhari	  was	  the	  successor	  of	  another	  Copt,	  Rizqallah	  al-­‐Badawi,	  who	  was	  the	  personal	  confidant	  to	  Ali	  Bey	  al-­‐Kabir.	  Ibrahim	  was	  	  the	  mubasher	  for	  both	  Ibrahim	  and	  Murad	  Bey	  and	  his	  brother	  Jirjiswould	  succeed	  him	  after	  his	  death	  and	  go	  on	  to	  serve	  for	  Napoleon.	  In	  addition	  to	  accumulating	  a	  vast	  fortune,	  the	  Jawhari	  brothers	  achieved	  sainthood	  in	  the	  Coptic	  church	  through	  their	  generous	  contributions	  to	  renovating	  Coptic	  churches	  and	  aiding	  the	  community.	  	  22	  Otto	  Meinardus,	  Two	  Thousand	  Years	  of	  Coptic	  Christianity,	  p.	  66,	  quoted	  in	  Armanious,	  Note	  10	  to	  pages	  5-­‐6,	  p.	  156.	  	  23	  Napoleon	  Bonaparte.	  “2895	  –	  Ordre,”	  Correspondance	  de	  Napoléon	  1er;	  publiée	  par	  l’ordre	  de	  Napoléon	  III,	  Vol.	  IV,	  p.	  282.	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administration in Egypt.  For the first time since the Arab invasion, a Copt had served beyond an 
advisory role to an executive function in the Egyptian government—in this case, the highest 
executive office in the country. While Copts, because of their relatively high levels of education, 
had always served in the rural tax collection administration in Ottoman times, the tax collection 
administration in Egypt under the French occupation was almost entirely Coptic. Jirjis Al-
Jawhari, who was also responsible for negotiating between the French occupiers and local 
Muslim authority figures, used his newfound position of power to obtain substantial increases in 
the rights of Copts from Napoleon, who overturned almost all the dhimmi status laws imposed on 
Copts in Ottoman Egypt in this letter addressed to Al-Jawhari on December 7, 1798.24  
J’ai reçu, Citoyen, la lettre que m’a écrite la nation copte. Je me ferai toujours un plaisir 
de la protéger. Désormais elle ne sera plus avilie, et, lorsque les circonstances le 
permettront, ce que je prévois ne pas être éloigné, je lui accorderai le droit d’exercer son 
culte publiquement , comme il est d’usage en Europe, en suivant chacun sa croyance. Je 
punirai sévèrement les villages qui, dans les différentes révoltes, ont assassiné des 
Coptes. Dès aujourd’hui vous pourrez leur annoncer que je leur permets de porter des 
armes, de monter sur des mules ou des chevaux, de porter des turbans et de s’habiller à 
la manière qui peut leur convenir. 
 
Mais, si tous les jours sont marquės de ma part par des bienfaits, si j’ai à restituer à la 
nation copte une dignité et des droits inséparables de l’homme, qu’elle avait perdus, j’ai 
le droit, sans doute, d’exiger des individus qui la composent beaucoup de zèle et de 
fidélité au service de la République. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Napoleon	  Bonaparte.	  “3717	  –	  A	  L’Intendant	  General	  De	  L’Egypte,”	  Correspondance	  de	  Napoléon	  1er;	  publiée	  
par	  l’ordre	  de	  Napoléon	  III,	  Vol.	  V,	  p.	  184.	  My	  rough	  translation:	  (I	  received,	  citizen,	  the	  letter	  written	  to	  me	  by	  the	  Coptic	  nation.	  It	  will	  always	  be	  a	  pleasure	  to	  protect	  them.	  From	  now	  on,	  they	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  degraded,	  and,	  once	  the	  circumstances	  permit	  it,	  which	  I	  do	  not	  expect	  to	  take	  long,	  I	  will	  give	  them	  the	  right	  to	  practice	  their	  religion	  openly,	  as	  is	  normal	  in	  Europe,	  with	  everyone	  pursuing	  his	  own	  beliefs.	  I	  will	  severely	  punish	  the	  villages	  that,	  in	  the	  different	  revolts,	  murdered	  the	  Copts.	  From	  today	  on,	  you	  may	  announce	  to	  the	  Copts	  that	  I	  will	  allow	  them	  to	  bear	  arms,	  ride	  mules	  or	  horses,	  wear	  turbans	  and	  dress	  themselves	  in	  whatever	  manner	  they	  prefer.	  	  	   However,	  if	  these	  days	  are	  marked	  on	  my	  part	  by	  benefits	  to	  the	  Copts,	  if	  I	  restore	  to	  the	  Coptic	  nation	  its	  dignity	  and	  the	  inseparable	  human	  rights	  that	  it	  had	  lost,	  I	  have	  the	  right,	  undoubtedly,	  to	  expect	  from	  the	  Copts	  a	  lot	  of	  zeal	  and	  loyalty	  in	  service	  to	  the	  French	  Republic.	  	  	   I	  cannot	  deny	  that	  I	  have	  reason	  to	  complain	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  zeal	  that	  several	  Copts	  have	  shown.	  How	  is	  it	  that,	  if	  everyday	  the	  main	  sheikhs	  show	  me	  the	  treasures	  of	  the	  Mamelukes,	  those	  that	  served	  as	  their	  principal	  agents	  [Copts]	  do	  not	  show	  me	  anything?	  	  	   I	  do	  justice	  to	  your	  patriarch,	  whose	  virtues	  and	  intentions	  are	  known	  to	  me.	  I	  do	  justice	  to	  your	  zeal	  and	  those	  of	  your	  coreligionists,	  and	  I	  hope	  that	  in	  the	  future,	  I	  will	  have	  nothing	  but	  praise	  for	  the	  entire	  Coptic	  nation.)	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Je ne peux pas vous dissimuler que j’ai eu effectivement à me plaindre du peu de zèle que 
plusieurs ont montré. Comment, en effet, lorsque tous les jours des principaux cheiks me 
découvrent les trésors des Mameluks, ceux qui étaient leurs principaux agents ne me 
font-ils rien découvrir? 
 
Je rends justice à votre patriarche, dont les vertus et l’intention me sont connues. Je 
rends justice à votre zèle et à celui de vos collaborateurs, et j’espère que, dans la suite, je 
n’aurai qu’à me louer de toute la nation copte. 
 
In this letter, which was a response to a request by Al-Jawhari on behalf of the Coptic 
community to protect the Copts, Napoleon used the language of the French revolution to assure 
the Copts that he would protect them and “severely punish” the villages that had inflicted 
massacres on Copts during battles between the French and Ottomans. Napoleon also removed 
many of the limitations imposed on Copts by the dhimmi laws, granting Christians the right to 
carry arms, ride horses, and wear any clothes they could.25 Napoleon vowed to restore to the 
Copts their “indispensable human rights” and their dignity, though he made clear that he 
expected the Copts to serve the French republic with loyalty and zeal in return. Napoleon also 
expressed his disappointment that Copts, who were the principal agents of the beys, were not as 
forthcoming in sharing information with Napoleon about the material possessions of the Islamic 
rulers in Egypt.  Napoleon even ended his letter with a statement of respect to the patriarch of the 
Coptic Church, of whose virtues and intentions he says he was aware.  After hundreds of years of 
second-class citizenship in their own country under the confines of dhimmi laws, Copts finally 
regained certain basic rights that elevated them to equal citizenship with Muslims26 because of 
the graciousness of the French emperor Napoleon, perhaps confirming the belief among many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Under	  dhimmi	  laws	  in	  Egypt,	  Copts	  were	  limited	  to	  only	  blue	  or	  black	  dress	  and	  could	  not	  wear	  clothing	  considered	  ornate	  or	  flamboyant.	  	  26	  Some	  might	  say	  they	  were	  even	  better	  off	  than	  their	  Muslim	  compatriots	  during	  the	  French	  occupation	  because	  they	  dominated	  the	  local	  French	  administration	  in	  Egypt.	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Copts that their only hope for true security and equality in their native land was under the 
jurisdiction of their European coreligionists.  
Napoleon’s decision to lift the ban on Copts’ ability to bear arms also proved to be 
beneficial to his French army. In addition to Jirjis Al-Jawhari, there were several high-ranking 
Copts in the French military administration in Egypt, but perhaps none was as influential as 
Mu’allim Ya’qub, who became the first non-French general in Napoleon’s army.27 Mu’allim 
Ya’qub was the son of Mu’allim Hanna, a prominent Copt in the Upper Egyptian town of 
Mallawi. Ya’qub was thus given access to a privileged education and rose to a position of 
prominence by becoming the general steward for Sulayman Bey, the governor of the Upper 
Egyptian province of Assiut.28 Ya’qub, who married a Syrian Catholic, took advantage of his 
prominent family background and his connections to the Syrian Catholic community to develop 
a prominent trading business with European agents in Egypt.  
In August 1798, Jirjis al-Jawhari tapped Ya’qub to accompany Napoleon’s deputy, 
General Desaix, on an expedition to Upper Egypt to pursue the retreating Mameluke beys and 
their soldiers.29 Ya’qub distinguished himself on the battlefield—a sharp turn of fortune for a 
Copt who just a few years earlier was not allowed to even bear arms or ride a horse under 
Islamic law—and was even granted a sword of honor by General Desaix.30 After a successful 
expedition, Ya’qub was charged by Desaix in January of 1799 with organizing the postal service 
in Upper Egypt, and then with handling tax collection in the province for the French 
administration. In 1800, Ya’qub used his wealth and privilege to donate land in Cairo to build a 
new Coptic patriarchate. The construction of a new Coptic cathedral is further evidence that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Coller,	  21.	  	  28	  Anouar	  Louca.	  L’Autre Egypte: de Bonaparte à Taha Hussein. Le Caire: Institut Français d’Archéologie 
Orientale, 2006. 17-­‐18.	   29	  Louca,	  20.	  	  30	  Louca,	  21	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Napoleon overturned the dhimmi laws suppressing the Copts, since under Islamic rule the Copts 
had been denied the right to build or even remodel churches.  In April 1800, Mameluke forces 
had infiltrated Cairo and incited the local Muslim population to launch a sustained attack on the 
Coptic quarter—presumably out of anger at the newfound place of privilege the Copts had 
carved for themselves by cooperating with the French. While some rich Copts fled to the 
Ottoman quarters to bribe the Turks for protection, Klèber, who was the highest-ranking French 
general in Egypt at the time, issued an order on April 17 mandating the Copts to stay in their 
quarter, and that Ya’qub, whom he titled “l’aga de la nation cophte,” be in charge with executing 
the order and defending the Coptic quarter.31 
Ya’qub recruited fit Coptic men originally from Upper Egypt to form a new military unit 
under the command of his nephew, Gabriel Sidarous, and to be trained by French military 
officers. Ya’qub managed to create a legitimate fighting force out of rural peasants, a feat that 
impressed the historian Nicolas Turk, who said that the Coptic soldiers, “devinrent semblables à 
des Français meme plus endurants et plus agiles.32” Ya’qub’s army of soldiers defending the 
Coptic quarter had become a full-fledged Coptic legion that reinforced the depleting French 
army in their battles against the Turks. While, there had been Syrian soldiers who had joined the 
French campaign in the Levant, and there was even a Greek Legion also forming in late 1800, 
the Coptic Legion was the most significant non-French force in Napoleon’s army because it was 
the largest—numbering over 1,000 men who fought for the French.33 As Ian Coller explains, 
such a sizable force of armed Copts under the leadership of a Coptic general, “represented a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Louca,	  35	  32	  Louca,	  36.	  My	  translation:	  (became	  similar	  to	  the	  French	  but	  even	  stronger	  and	  more	  agile.)	  33	  Coller,	  40.	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radical alteration to the traditional social balance in Egypt”34—an alteration that would not have 
been possible without the French occupation of Egypt.  
When the French were eventually forced to capitulate to the British-Ottoman alliance in 
late 1801, the soldiers of the Coptic legion—as with all Egyptian collaborators with the French—
faced a difficult decision. The capitulation agreement guaranteed the security of former French 
collaborators, and some prominent Copts, such as Jirjis al-Jawhari decided to stay and retained 
positions of high rank in the new Ottoman administration. Though the Ottoman captain Hussein 
Pasha personally asked him to stay in Egypt, Ya’qub did not trust the Turks and decided to move 
to France with the remainder of the French administration. While he could not convince all the 
soldiers in the Coptic legion to come with him, he managed to bring a substantive number along 
on the Pallas, the last frigate scheduled to leave Alexandria harbor for Marseille. According to 
General Beillard, the Egyptians leaving on the Pallas consisted of 438 Coptic males, 221 
Melkites, and 93 Muslims, as well as the women and children that accompanied them.35 
Unfortunately, Ya’qub died of dysentery within a week of the Pallas’ departure from 
Alexandria, allegedly due to a poisoned cup of coffee given to him by Hussein Pacha just before 
his departure.36 With his death, the Egyptian émigrés on the Pallas lost their leader—the only 
thing binding them altogether—and, most acutely, Ya’qub’s project for an independent Egypt. 
While many Copts chose to return to Egypt after landing in Marseilles, the Coptic legion 
remained under the leadership of Gabriel Sidarous and went on to fight in many of Napoleon’s 
battles, including Waterloo.37 A small Egyptian community, predominantly Melkite, remained in 
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  Ibid.	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  Coller	  42.	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  Louca,	  24.	  	  37	  Coller,	  58-­‐59.	  Ironically,	  though	  most	  of	  these	  soldiers	  were	  Coptic	  or	  Melkite	  Christians,	  Napoleon	  had	  them	  wear	  green	  turbans	  with	  crescents	  on	  them	  in	  order	  to	  intimidate	  their	  European	  enemies.	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Marseilles in relative poverty, though a few Egyptians, such as the Coptic professor Elias 
Bocthor, managed to find some success in Paris leveraging their knowledge of Egypt.  
Ya’qub’s true reasons for emigration, however, would only be made public years after his 
death, with the discovery of documents from the English captain of the Pallas alluding to 
Ya’qub’s aspirations for an independent Egypt. Apparently, Ya’qub and his deputies had 
developed a plan for re-invading Egypt and liberating it from Turkish control, and his main 
reason for going to France was to secure French and British support for his project of an 
independent Egypt. According to the captain of the Pallas, Joseph Edmonds, “[Ya’qub] declared 
(in his mind) any Government was preferable to that of the Turkish, that he had joined the 
French from a patriotic wish of ameliorating the hardships of his countrymen, …that he has yet 
hopes through the European Governments to do his country good and conceived his going to 
France would conduce to that effect.”38 
Unfortunately, Ya’qub’s untimely death put an end to his aspirations for a European-
backed effort to liberate Egypt. However, it is telling that the first formal Egyptian conception of 
a plot for Egyptian independence came from a Copt who many had derided as a collaborator with 
the French. Clearly, Ya’qub’s leadership in the French administration was not intended to further 
French colonial rule over Egypt, but rather to finally end hundreds of years of Turkish-
Mameluke rule that had been difficult for all Egyptians, and in particular Copts like Ya’qub. 
Ya’qub was siding with the French against another of Egypt’s foreign rulers, not against Egypt 
itself, and his ultimate aim was to established Egyptian self-rule, a desire that would motivate 
many prominent Egyptian political figures, quite a few Copts among them, in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Furthermore, it was only through exposure to French culture and the ideals of the 
French Revolution, that Ya’qub was able to develop an argument for Egyptian independence that 	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would appeal to the sensibilities of European powers, mostly by referencing the Egyptian roots 
of civilization, the need for a new sense of Egyptian citizenship, and the practical benefits to 
Europe of an independent Egypt.39 Despite the premature end to the French occupation of Egypt, 
European influence in the country would continue to grow throughout the 19th century, 
developing new generations of Egyptian leaders influenced by European liberal ideals and 
anxious to create an independent state with full citizenship for both Copts and Muslims.  
 
The Egypt of the Khedives 
 
Mohammad Ali Pasha 
 
 After the French vacated Egypt in 1801 in accordance with British demands, Egypt fell 
into a state of conflict between Ottoman soldiers sent to reinforce claims over Egypt and local 
Mamelukes, who had experienced some degree of autonomy in ruling Egypt even under 
ostensible Ottoman rule.  Mohammad Ali, a Janissary officer of Albanian extraction, 
commanded his armies to victory over the Mamelukes. Mohammad Ali, who would be the first 
Ottoman governor, or “Pasha,” in Egypt, went on to consolidate his control of the country and 
lead Egypt autonomously as an entity distinct from the rest of the Ottoman Empire.  Mohammad 
Ali and his successors defined their reigns by trying to turn Egypt into a modern state following 
the model of western European countries, particularly France. Even though Mohammad Ali’s 
turn to power was predicated on the French abandonment of its imperial designs in Egypt, the 
epoch of the Mohammad Ali dynasty (1801-1952) would be defined by a sharp increase in the 
presence of Europeans in Egypt and their influence on all levels of society. The number of 
Europeans in Egypt increased drastically over the 19th century, without even taking into 
consideration the thousands of Egyptians educated in European-run schools and the many 	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Levantine and Armenian immigrants to Egypt who adopted European cultural and social 
practices. While at the beginning of Mohammad Ali’s reign a French traveler claimed there were 
only three “Europeans” in all of Alexandria, by 1863, the French consulate in Cairo calculated 
that the permanent French population in Egypt numbered over 11,000 people.40 
An integral part of Mohammad Ali’s vision to turn Egypt into a modern European state 
was to modernize the Egyptian government by basing his selection of high-level government 
officials solely on qualifications, regardless on their religious affiliation. During his reign, many 
Copts, Greeks, and Armenians attained high-level positions of authority in the Egyptian 
government, particularly in the finance ministry. While Mohammad Ali dismissed Jirjis al-
Jawhari from his position as General Steward of Egypt for unclear reasons, he tapped another 
Copt, Mu’allim Ghali, to replace him.  Ghali formalized the country’s tax collection system by 
commissioning a survey of all of the country’s land and then dividing the arable land into taxable 
segments.41 Another of Ghali’s legacies was his conversion to Catholicism.  Evoking the 
unification attempts between the Catholic and Coptic churches in the 16th and 17th centuries, the 
French ambassador allegedly asked Mohammad Ali to force the Coptic Orthodox Church into a 
union with Rome. Ghali advised Mohammad Ali that there was no way the Coptic patriarch 
would accept such compulsion and instead suggested that the best way to encourage the spread 
of Catholicism in Egypt was to convert to Catholicism himself, which he did.42 Ghali was later 
incarcerated, allegedly for misappropriating funds, and was killed in 1822 by Ibrahim Pasha, 	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Mohammad Ali’s oldest son.43 Despite the tragic ending to his life and service, Mu’allim Ghali 
still stands as a symbol of Coptic power and influence during the reign of Mohammad Ali, and 
there were many other Copts who continued to serve in the highest levels of the Egyptian 
government under the Mohammad Ali dynasty.   
Copts had dominated tax collection in Egypt for at least a century prior to Mohammad 
Ali’s rule, thus most land surveyors, tax collectors, and scribes were Coptic.44 Copts had been 
well suited to fulfill the role of tax collectors in Egypt because they long had their own arcane 
system of accounting and measurements that only they could understand.45 Because of the 
disorganization of the finance department and the lack of a regular budget, only the Copts who 
had been in the administration knew the real amount of revenues and expenses into the Treasury, 
thus creating a governmental dependence on Copts in the finance bureaucracy and ensuring that 
there would always be high-level positions for Copts to fill in the khedivial government. This 
dependence also allowed some Copts to take advantage of their necessity to gain from corruption 
by misallocating funds or receiving bribes to underreport the holdings of wealthy landowners, 
enabling them to accumulate significant wealth of their own.46  
Mohammad Ali’s meritocracy, a product of European inspiration, was a boon for Copts 
and paved the way for the emergence of a landed Coptic aristocracy that would play an integral 
role in both communal and national politics later in the century. Most of the prominent and 	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wealthy Coptic families in the late 19th and early 20th centuries could trace the origins of their 
wealth to prestigious and profitable advisory positions in the Egyptian government in the 19th 
century that gave Copts sizable incomes, through both salaries and corruption, to purchase 
agricultural land and other assets.  
 
Legal Reforms Under the Khedives 
As explained in part one of this thesis, the social status of the Copts in Egypt improved 
dramatically under the French occupation after Napoleon decided to lift all the dhimmi laws 
restricting the freedoms of Copts.  Unfortunately for Copts, this provoked some backlash among 
Muslim quarters, and their legal status reverted back to the dhimmi laws after the French left 
Egypt. One expression of the Muslim backlash at the newfound legal emancipation of Christians 
under the French occupation comes from the Arab historian Al-Jabarti, who, in his description of 
the French occupation, said, “Another development was the elevation of the lowliest Copts, 
Syrian and Greek Christians, and Jews. They rode horses and adorned themselves with swords 
because of their service to the French; they strutted around haughtily, openly expressed 
obscenities, and derided the Muslims.”47 
Under the rule of Mohammad Ali and the other khedives, Copts slowly began to regain 
the rights they had been granted by Napoleon, as Mohammad Ali and his descendants sought to 
impress Europeans and elevate Egypt to the status of a European state. In 1817, Mohammad Ali 
allowed for church bells to be rung, new churches to be built, and old churches to be repaired.48 
By the end of his reign, Mohammad Ali had also ended the restrictions on clothing for Copts. 
The jizya tax was officially abolished in Egypt in December 1855 under the reign of Sa’id Pasha 	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(1854-1863), Mohammad Ali’s youngest son, a few months before the European powers would 
force the Ottomans to abolish the tax throughout the empire as part of the Hamayouni Decree 
ending the Crimean War in February 1856. One month later, Sa’id Pasha would begin the 
conscription of Christians into the military, which was ambiguously received by Christians.49 
Many Copts in Assiut, particularly the wealthier ones, were opposed to the conscription of their 
sons. There are different viewpoints on how Patriarch Kyrollos (Cyril) IV felt about 
conscription. Some sources posit that he was worried about the exposure Christian conscripts 
would have to conversion pressures from their Muslim superiors, though other sources differ and 
recount that Patriarch Kyrollos IV personally requested form Sa’id Pasha that Copts be promoted 
to the officer corps.50  
Under Sa’id Pasha’s rule, the Ottoman millet system was also still relevant, as Copts 
were governed by their Patriarch in certain matters of personal status. For example, Kyrollos IV 
objected to the division of inheritance according to Islamic law, arguing that according to 
Christian doctrine, a women’s inheritance should be equal to that of a man’s. Kyrollos also 
established a minimum age for marriage of 14, a concept that did not exist according to Islamic 
law.51 Clearly, the Coptic Orthodox Church still maintained some jurisdiction over its citizens 
during the reign of the khedives and could govern themselves with alternatives to Sharia law. 
Outside of personal status matters, under Sa’id Pasha’s rule, Copts were allowed to be members 
of the regional judicial councils that adjudicated legal cases. In December 1857, Sa’id Pasha 
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issued an order explicitly demanding total equality between litigants regardless of religion, 
affirming that all citizens had the exact same rights.52 
The Copts would see even more legal advances under the reign of Khedive Isma’il (1863-
1879), who was heavily influenced by Europe and extremely motivated to see Egypt resemble a 
European state. Of all the khedives, Coptic sources portray Ismail the most positively, 
particularly because he donated money to the Coptic Church.53 In 1863, at the debut of his reign, 
Isma’il altered conversion policies to mandate that any Copt had to seek the approval of a Coptic 
priest before converting to Islam in order to prove that they were not under any compulsion. 
Only after the priest verified the aspiring convert’s declaration would the conversion become 
official.54 Conversion had always been an extremely sensitive subject for Copts, particularly 
when evidence arose of forced conversions to Islam, so this added layer of bureaucracy that 
served as an obstacle to conversions was quite a concession to Copts. In 1866 Khedive Isma’il 
established the Consultative Council to supervise the Khedive’s expenditures and tax policies, 
giving Egyptians a newfound degree of self-governance over the affairs of the state. Copts from 
some of the prominent landowning families that made their fortunes from the civil service in the 
first half of the 19th century featured on this Council.55 Copts were now occupying high-level 
executive posts in Egypt’s government, going beyond serving as functionaries and scribes in the 
finance administration to positions of real power that they had attained during the French 
occupation.  
 
The Copts and Russia 	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Over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire fought several wars 
with Russia. With the exception of the Crimean War, where western European states allied with 
the Ottomans, Russia won these wars, allowing it to extend its territory deeper into the Caucasus. 
More importantly, these victories enabled Russia to claim a right of protection over the Orthodox 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire, much like the French had with the Catholics. Because Egypt 
was governed autonomously under Mohammad Ali, this right of protection did not automatically 
extend to Orthodox Christians in Egypt, who comprised one of the largest Christian minorities in 
the Middle East. The Russians thus directly approached the Coptic Patriarch Boutros al-Jawali 
during the reign of Mohammad Ali asking him to place the Coptic Church under Russian 
protection. Patriarch Boutros VII rejected the Russians’ offer, claiming that the Coptic Orthodox 
Church was under the sole protection of God, who, unlike the czar, was immortal.56 Whether 
Boutros made this decision out of confidence in the security of Coptic interests under 
Mohammad Ali’s rule or a fierce sense of patriotism, his decision gained him considerable 
prestige in the eyes of Egypt’s ruler. Mohammad Ali is said to have been delighted by Boutros’ 
refusal of Russian protection, going so far as to say to Boutros: “Truly, today you have raised 
your standing and the standing of your country, so let you have the position of Mohammad Ali in 
Egypt, and let there be a carriage like his carriage outfitted for you to ride.”57 
Despite Boutros’ rejection of Russian protection, the 19th century saw the Coptic 
Orthodox Church move much closer to the other Orthodox churches, particularly fellow Oriental 
Orthodox churches like the Armenians, Ethiopians, and Syrians. In fact, when the Copts in Egypt 
were divided over who should succeed Boutros VII after his death in 1852, the Egyptian 
government decided to give the Armenian metropolitan in Egypt temporary jurisdiction over 	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Coptic affairs until he could mediate a solution between the two Coptic factions.58  Kyrollos IV, 
who ended up succeeding Boutros VII, was intent on seeking unity with the other Orthodox 
churches and became very close with the heads of the Greek and Armenian Orthodox churches. 
Kyrollos’ project of unity among the Orthodox churches was undertaken with the intention of 
placing the Copts under Russian protection59, a sharp departure from Boutros VII’s rejection of 
the idea. Allegedly, Kyrollos’ design to seek Russian protection infuriated Sa’id Pasha to the 
point where he ordered Kyrollos’ poisoning.60 Because of Kyrollos’ poisoning, future patriarchs 
would shy away from projects of Orthodox unity or the seeking of Russian protection from the 
fear of achieving the same fate as Kyrollos. Just as the Coptic patriarchs did with the Catholic 
Church in the 16th century, Kyrollos IV found it useful to Copts to use the prospect of Christian 
unity to find a foreign protector for the Copts among the European powers. Though the situation 
for Copts under the khedives was relatively benign, a current of thought within the Coptic 
community was still more comfortable seeking European guarantees of protection than relying 
on the generosity of Muslim rulers, however open-minded they may have been.  
 
French Educational Influence 
 In his attempt to mold Egypt into a European state, Mohammad Ali sought the advice of 
French advisors, as he viewed France as the model state for Egypt to replicate. French influence 
was most pronounced in education, both through Mohammad Ali’s student missions to France 
and the role of the French in developing a modern education system in Egypt.  Mohammad Ali 
recruited French advisors who had served for Napoleon to help build a state-run education 
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system in Egypt, a concept that had been spearheaded in France. Starting in 1811, Mohammad 
Ali began to build colleges in various disciplines—The School of Engineering, Military School, 
School of Medicine, and School of Foreign Languages—that were administered by the 
Department of War and were all directed by European headmasters.61 These schools were 
intended to build a local elite to serve as government officials and army officers. Because of this, 
Christians, and most Egyptian Muslims, were forbidden from studying at these schools as 
attendance was mostly reserved for those of Turkish and Circassian origin who dominated Egypt 
in the early 19th century. 62 Mohammad Ali also began sending promising students to study in 
Europe, particularly in France. The first large mission of Egyptian students to France was 
initiated in 1826 and consisted of 40 students, all members of the Turkish elite in Egypt, and one 
Egyptian sheikh, Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, who was added to the delegation at the last minute to 
supervise the students.63  
Though Copts were also excluded from Mohammad Ali’s student missions, just as they 
were from his advanced educational institutions, they still benefited from the impact that 
European education had on local Muslim elites. Europeanized Muslims began to adopt modern 
French notions of democracy, equality, and cultural progress. Copts would never have been able 
to become so influential in the Egyptian economy and politics in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries without the liberalization of local Muslims. Only because Egyptian Muslims began 
respecting the skills and assets of local Christian and Jewish populations, could these populations 
achieve positions of power. In many ways, the progression and liberalization of Muslim 
Egyptian thought was just as integral to the advancement of Copts in Egypt, and the widespread 	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social acceptance of their relative economic clout, as the reforms that gave Copts more 
educational opportunities.  For example, Rifa’a al-Tahtawi was extremely influenced by the 
modern civilization he witnessed in France and everything he learned from his French 
colleagues. He returned to Egypt imbued with French democratic ideals and was an instrumental 
intellectual guide of the nahda, or Arab Renaissance, of the 19th century. Tahtawi introduced the 
concept of the watan, or homeland, to Arab intellectual thought64, thereby initiating the notion 
that the homeland—in this case, Egypt—could precede religion in importance. The elevation of 
the homeland was especially important to Egypt’s Copts, whose deep roots in Egypt were 
acknowledged by their Muslim compatriots, and who benefited from a strain of thought that 
placed the nation at the center of society, regardless of religious affiliation. This strain of thought 
would have taken much longer to take hold in Egypt were it not for the profound influence that 
French education had on Egyptian Muslim thinkers like Tahtawi.  
The influence of France on the development of the education system in Egypt was also 
made obvious by the creation of a General Council of School Reorganization in 1836, which was 
charged with organizing the Egyptian education system and which proposed the creation of 
primary and secondary schools to prepare students for the military-run higher education 
institutions.65  The council had seven French members, three French-educated Armenians, and 
two Egyptians, one of whom was Rifa’a al-Tahtawi.66 Clearly, the French heavily influenced the 
development of the Egyptian government education system.   
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The Egyptian student missions to France were so successful that in 1844, a permanent 
Egyptian Military School in Paris was created.67 The school was supervised by the French 
Ministry of War and hosted students from the new higher education institutions in Cairo that 
were directed by Europeans. The students were meant to undergo extensive military training and 
academic preparation at the Egyptian Military School before matriculating to advanced French 
education institutions such as the Military School of Metz or the École Polytechnique in Paris.  
The students were housed in the dormitories of L’Ecole Egyptien in Paris, along with the other 
Egyptian students on academic missions in Paris. Though the school was short-lived—it was 
closed by Abbas Pasha in 1849 only to reopen for a few years in 1869—its existence solidified 
the dependence that the Egyptian military had on French educational institutions to educate 
Egypt’s Muslim elites and prepare them for service in the government bureaucracy or the officer 
corps.  
In addition to French influence on the creation of Egypt’s government-run schools, which 
were intended primarily for Turkish and Circassian elites, the 19th century also witnessed an 
expansion of the French Catholic missionary presence in Egypt. These missionaries built schools 
all over Egypt, which, because of the religious nature of the education, tended to appeal to local 
Christians more than Muslims. These schools taught all instruction in French and attracted both 
local Egyptian elites and Levantine and Armenian students. Though the student body was 
predominantly Christian—which was advantageous to Copts as they gained foreign language 
skills that were valuable assets in careers in business or politics—some Muslims also attended, 
helping to expand the class of Europeanized Muslims that enabled the liberal age in Egypt to 
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take hold in the late 19th century.68 The most prominent of the French secondary schools in Egypt 
was the College de la Sainte Famille in Cairo, which was founded by the Jesuits in 1879, and 
graduated many prominent names in Egyptian society69. More French schools would continue to 
be built into the 20th century, including the College Saint Marc in Alexandria, which was built in 
1926 and was then the largest secondary school in the Middle East70. The French government 
actively aided the construction of French-language schools by Catholic orders; the French consul 
in Egypt assisted the orders in procuring land and permits for schools all over Egypt.71 These 
schools would help graduate a cosmopolitan, French-speaking Egyptian elite that comprised 
Copts, Jews, Levantines, Armenians, and liberal Egyptian Muslims. The Christian nature of the 
schools made them more appealing to Copts, and the prevalence of Catholic and Protestant 
missionary schools allowed Copts to fulfill their educational aspirations despite being denied 
entry into the military-run government schools in Cairo.  
 
The Church Mission Society and Coptic Reforms 
The Protestant missionary experience in Egypt began in 1825 with the first mission 
dispatched to Egypt by the English-based Church Missionary Society (CMS)72, an Anglican 	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missionary group very present in the Middle East. The group’s expansion into Egypt was 
encouraged by William Jowett, its literary representative for the Middle East, who viewed Egypt 
as a natural gateway to spread the missionary message throughout Asia and Africa. The decision 
to move into Egypt was made easier by the 1824 decree by the Ottoman Sultan prohibiting the 
import of biblical scriptures into the Empire, rendering the group’s missionary activity in Syria 
impossible.73 Because Egypt was then ruled autonomously by Mohammad Ali, who had 
instituted a climate of religious tolerance in the country, missionaries in Egypt encountered no 
such hostility from the local government. The original purpose of the CMS mission into Egypt 
was not to convert the Copts to Anglicanism but rather to improve the state of the Coptic Church.  
Britons in the 19th-century had a strong fascination with the Coptic Church because of its 
rich Christian heritage, Egypt’s role as a place of refuge for Jesus, its long history under Muslim 
domination, and its legacy as an apostolic church.74 There also could have been a sense of 
similarity between the Coptic Orthodox and Anglican churches since both churches had phases 
of contention with the Roman Catholic Church and were churches with a strong autonomous, 
national identity.75 Instead of conversion, Jowett argued that the missionaries should aim to 
resurrect and improve the state of the Coptic Church. Many Western visitors to Egypt had 
viewed Copts as morally corrupt because of their alleged disposition to lying, their servility to 
Muslim overlords, their corruption, and their perceived fondness for alcohol, especially arak. 76 
Moreover, Coptic priests at the time were generally looked down upon even by most Copts, as 
they usually had lower-class origins, were illiterate, and demanded payment for the performance 
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of their most basic duties.77 As Paul Sedra explains, “Jowett advocated, rather, the resurrection of 
the glories and grandeur of the primitive Church…[which] demanded the imposition of ‘order’ 
upon the ‘fallen’ Coptic Church.”78 The key to the CMS strategy of improving the state of the 
Coptic Church was to enable Copts to read and understand the Scriptures properly.79 This 
strategy necessitated the introduction of modern methods of schooling to the Copts, and the 
education of Copts became the central focus of the CMS mission in Egypt for the entirety of its 
duration.  
The first CMS school in Egypt was a boys' school in Cairo founded in May 1828 by CMS 
missionary William Krusé. The school instructed students in both Arabic and English and while 
the focus of the curriculum was undoubtedly on the Scriptures, students also received lessons in 
mathematics, geography, history, grammar, science, and even drawing.80 Even more impressive 
was the creation of a girls’ school in Cairo in February 1829 by Krusé’s wife that soon attracted 
more students than the boys’ school.81 The mission’s most ambitious education effort, however, 
was The Coptic Institution, a school dedicated solely to educating Copts wishing to become 
priests. The school was spearheaded by John Lieder, the head of the CMS mission in Egypt, and 
was submitted to the Coptic Patriarch (Boutros II) for approval in 1840 and finally established 
three years later.82 The school aimed to ameliorate the rampant illiteracy among Coptic priests by 
educating them in Arabic, Coptic, English, the Scriptures, and the sciences. Though the Coptic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Seikaly,	  “Coptic	  Reform”,	  248.	  	  78	  Sedra,	  227.	  	  79	  Ibid.	  	  80	  Sedra,	  230.	  	  81	  Ibid.,	  231.	  	  82	  Ibid.,	  233.	  	  
	  	   36	  
Institution would only last five years,83 the CMS focus on expanding educational opportunities 
for Copts would usher in a new era of Coptic educational reformation, particularly under the 
leadership of Patriarch Kyrollos IV, who served from 1854 to 1861. Kyrollos was a bishop 
during the experiment with the Coptic Institutution, so it is very likely that he had been exposed 
to John Lieder and the Coptic Missionary Society. The influence of Protestant ideas on Kyrollos 
is clearly demonstrated by his iconoclastic beliefs, which were one of the key hallmarks of 
Protestantism. Kyrollos removed and destroyed all the icons in the Coptic Cathedral, a stark 
departure from centuries of an iconographic Orthodox tradition in the Coptic Church and clear 
evidence of Protestant influence.84 Kyrollos, who became known in Coptic circles as “Abu al-
Islah,” or the “Father of Reform,”85 was most known for his push to reform and expand Coptic 
education.   
Kyrollos’ most noteworthy educational achievement was the foundation of the secular 
Great Coptic School in Cairo in 1855. The school, though focused on educating Copts, was open 
to students of all faiths, who received free books and stationery. Students at the school learned 
Arabic, Coptic, English, Turkish, French, and Italian, as well as calligraphy, history, geography, 
and mathematics.86 The school was particularly noteworthy for educating the sons of Coptic 
elites who would go on to lead a lay movement for reform within the Church in the late 19th 
century.87 Interestingly, in order to print enough books to keep the school functioning, Kyrollos 
imported the first privately owned printing press into Egypt.88 Beyond the Great Coptic School, 	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Kyrollos also built two girls’ schools in Cairo and schools in Mansoura and Bush89, and he even 
mandated formal instruction in theology and Coptic for the Church’s many deacons.90 Access to 
education for Coptic girls, at both Coptic and missionary schools, contributed to the educational 
advantage Copts had over their Muslim compatriots, for whom girls’ education was unheard of. 
Having an educated women in a household raising children had a positive impact on the 
educational attainment of future generations of Copts, and the benefits of this would be felt by 
Copts through the 20th century.91 
 
American Presbyterian Missions and Church Reform 
Though Kyrollos’ successor, Demetrius II (1862-1870) would not continue Kyrollos’ 
reforms and neglected Coptic education, the expansion of American missionary activity in the 
1860s and onwards eventually prompted further reform in the Coptic Church. When John Lieder 
died in 1865 after 40 years of continuous work in Egypt, the Church Missionary Society’s 
presence in Egypt ended with him and would only return after the beginning of a British mandate 
in 1882 with a mandate focusing on the conversion of Egyptian Muslims.92 The gap in Egyptian 
Protestantism left by the dissolution of the Church Missionary Society would be filled by 
American Presbyterian missionaries, who first came to Egypt in 1854.93 Like the British that 
preceded them, the Americans were also motivated by a desire to reform the Coptic Orthodox 
Church and viewed the ability to read and understand the Scripture as essential to the spiritual 
reformation of Copts. As a result, the Americans also prioritized education and built numerous 	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schools in Egypt focused on educating Copts.94 However, unlike the Britons of the CMS who 
were fascinated by Coptic history and had a relatively amiable relationship with the Coptic 
Church, the American Presbyterians were keen to convert Copts and felt that conversion was the 
best way to energize the Coptic Church into a modernization. The Presbyterians were also much 
more present in Upper Egyptian towns, where the Coptic population was the highest and where 
many elite Coptic families were based. By 1863, American missionaries were running a girls’ 
school in Alexandria and a boys’ school and a girls’ school in Cairo, and in 1865 they 
established a center in Assiut that had a school for boys and girls.95 Over the course of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, American missionaries would establish more schools in Upper Egyptian 
towns like Luxor, opening thirty-five schools by 187896. Many of these schools, and the 
American school in Assiut in particular, would go on to educate many prominent Copts.  The 
Presbyterian missions in Egypt also began converting some Copts, reaching 600 Egyptian 
members by 1875 and receiving official government recognition as a sect from Khedive Tawfik 
in 1878.97 Like the Britons of the Church Missionary Society, the educational activity undertaken 
by the Americans also spurred a reactionary Coptic Orthodox reformation. As Samir Seikaly 
summarizes, “The American mission, although unsuccessful in detaching considerable numbers 
from the Church, nevertheless affected the general body of Copts through its educational 
activity, awakening in them a spirit of inquiry and keeping alive the impulse to reform.”98 
An internal Coptic reformation would return after the death of the extremely anti-reform and 
anti-Protestant Demetrius II in 1870. At the time, a group of prominent Copts, led by the 
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prominent government official Boutros Ghali, formed a society to push for communal reform, 
including better supervision of the Church’s holdings and affairs and increased church assistance 
to the poor.99 Boutros Ghali, who was born in Beni Suef100, was actually not a descendant of 
Mu’allim Ghali but got his name from the traditional Egyptian practice of following the son’s 
first name with his father’s first name. His father, Ghali Nayruz, was the steward for the estate of 
Prince Mustafa Fadil, and Ghali himself was actually educated in the Great Coptic School 
founded by Kyrollos IV, where he acquired language skills and where he eventually taught for 
several years.101 Though the clergy did not respond positively to the demands of Ghali and his 
group of reformers, the reformers were not intimidated. Boutros Ghali then authored a petition to 
Khedive Isma’il to confirm the foundation of a lay council, called the Maglis al-Milli, to assist 
the clergy in supervising church affairs and in continuing the reformation of the Coptic Orthodox 
Church.102 On February 15, 1874, Isma’il issued a Khedivial decree ordaining the Council, 
which had twelve elected members and twelve substitute members.103 According to S.S. Hasan, 
the impetus for lay supervision in the Coptic Church was the example of democratically-run 
American Presbyterian churches in Egypt.104 A few months later, disagreement over who was to 
succeed Demetrius II finally came to an end, and Kyrollos V became Patriarch. Departing from 
the anti-reform policies of his predecessor, Kyrollos V confirmed the Maglis al-Milli and worked 
with them to establish a Coptic girls’ school that same year.105 The next year, Kyrollos V 
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approved the Council’s proposal for a Theological College, intended to combat the widespread 
opinion among upper-class Copts that priests were illiterate and ignorant of Church history and 
theology. The Theological College was the first attempt at formal religious training for Coptic 
priests and monks since John Lieder’s Coptic Institute in 1848. The students at the Theological 
College were instructed in church history, liturgy and dogma, Coptic, and Arabic.106 The clergy 
were opposed to the practices of the Lay Council and tried to convince the Patriarch that their 
influence was impeding his authority. Eventually, when the Council tried to assert its right to 
deal with all the Church’s financial and civil matters, the Patriarch became opposed to the 
Council and its Theological College.107 The Council eventually stopped meeting, and thus the 
first stage of the Coptic nahda, or Renaissance, was over.  A few years later, however, in 1881, 
Boutros Ghali and his group of Coptic leaders, formed a new society, called the Coptic 
Charitable Society, with the sole purpose of ameliorating the miserable conditions of 
impoverished Copts, whom they felt the Church neglected.108 Again, the theme of Coptic reform 
as a response to missionary activity resurfaces as some historians like Mine Ener posit that the 
Coptic Charitable Society was formed as a response to Catholic and Protestant social work 
among poor Copts in Upper Egypt and the cities.109    
The actions of the Copts behind the maglis al-milli and the Coptic Charitable Society 
demonstrate that by the late 19th century, a well-educated and Westernized Coptic lay leadership, 
signified by Boutros Ghali, had emerged that wished to apply the education they had received at 
both Coptic and missionary schools to the amelioration and modernization of their Church. 
These Copts had been direct beneficiaries of both the incursion of missionary activity in Egypt 	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and the first wave of Coptic reform undertaken by Kyrollos IV, and they wished to see these 
reforms continue so that the Coptic Church would more closely meet the spiritual, educational, 
and financial needs of its adherents in an increasingly modern and Westernized Egypt. While 
they were certainly influenced by Protestant and Catholic ideas, these elites devoted their 
energies to improving and reforming their own Church instead of converting. The effect the 
American and British missionaries had in sparking a Coptic reformation affirmed the original 
intentions of the first Protestant missionaries to push for a modernization of the ancient Coptic 
Orthodox Church.  
The ‘Urabi Revolt and British Occupation 
 
 The resolve of Coptic reformers to liberalize the governance of their Church was 
strengthened in the wake of the British occupation in 1882, whose impact on Coptic-Muslim 
relations in modern Egypt was quite profound. The expansion of British and French government 
influence on Egyptian affairs began during the reign of Khedive Isma’il, who racked up 
tremendous debts to European creditors in his attempt to reconstruct Cairo as a model European 
city and to build the Suez Canal as a testament to Egyptian modernity. In 1876, Isma’il was 
forced into bankruptcy and the British and French governments inserted themselves into his 
government as representatives of European creditors to ensure the proper payment of debts.110 
By 1879, the Europeans had successfully forced out Isma’il and replaced him with his son, 
Khedive Tawfik. Though both the British and French played a role in Egyptian government at 
the time, the British were much more deeply invested in Egypt, which explains why the British 
were much more willing to militarily intervene in Egypt to safeguard their interests. In 1880, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110Donald Malcolm Reid. "The ‘Urabi revolution and the British conquest, 1879–1882." Modern Egypt, from 1517 
to the end of the twentieth century. Ed. M. W. Daly. Cambridge University Press, 1998. Cambridge Histories Online. 
Cambridge University Press. 10 March 2012 DOI:10.1017/CHOL9780521472111.010.  219.  
	  	   42	  
Britain accounted for a majority of Egypt’s debt, 80% of Egypt’s exports, 44% of Egyptian 
imports, 80% of Suez Canal traffic, and around half of the shares in the Suez Canal.111  
 The crushing burden of servicing European debt on the Egyptian treasury—even after 
interest on the debt was lowered from 6% to 4% in 1880 the debt payments comprised 50% of 
the government annual revenue112—necessitated tax increases that infuriated native Egyptians. 
Furthermore, Egyptians felt excluded from positions of power in their country as the Khedive’s 
government was almost exclusively made up of officials of Turko-Circassian origins. 
Furthermore, the British and French involvement in Egyptian government brought more 
Europeans into the government bureaucracy. In 1882, Europeans comprised 2% of all Egyptian 
government officials and drew 16% of the total Egyptian government payroll.113 The 
preponderance of Europeans in government necessitated the hiring of Syrian Christians—at the 
expense of native Egyptians, particularly Copts—to serve as interpreters and scribes in the 
Egyptian government. These various issues engendered resentment among Egyptians at the 
Turkish elite, the British and French interventionists, profiteering foreigners whether European 
or Levantine, and Khedive Tawfiq, who was autocratic and unsympathetic to Egyptians. The 
resentment culminated in a show of force by Egyptian army colonels led by the officer Ahmed 
‘Urabi who, on September 9, 1881, brought their soldiers to Abdeen palace to demand a new 
government and the election of a consultative council. Though Khedive Tawfiq had no choice 
but to comply, the revolution did not end there as tensions continued to mount and a new 
government struggled to take hold. 
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 On June 11, 1882, a streetfight in Alexandria between an Egyptian and a Maltese 
escalated into a full-scale riot that left fifty Europeans and two hundred and fifty Egyptians dead. 
As thousands of Europeans fled the Egyptian interior and Tawfiq fled to British protection in 
Alexandria, sporadic violence continued and on July 11, the British fleet in Alexandria began 
bombarding the city in preparation for an invasion.114 ‘Urabi, who remained the minister of war 
in a compromise cabinet formed after the Alexandria riots, had brought his forces to hold their 
ground at Kafr al-Dawwar, a midway point between Alexandria and Cairo. On the morning of 
September 13, the British, who had brought in reinforcements through Port Said, surprised 
‘Urabi and his forces and decimated them in battle.115 ‘Urabi was forced to surrender and the 
British solidified their control over Egypt, beginning a 70-year military occupation of the country 
and an exercise of authority over the country’s governance through the British consul-general in 
Cairo.   
 The position of the Copts in regards to the ‘Urabi revolt remains a point of contention. 
Two Copts, including Boutros Ghali, served in the 1881-1882 council that was formed in the 
wake of ‘Urabi’s September 1881 march on Abdeen Palace.116 Most Copts were also very 
sympathetic to the nationalist slogan of “Egypt for the Egyptians” that had been used by many of 
Tawfiq’s opponents prior to the ‘Urabi revolt.117 Furthermore, Copts were just as agitated as 
Egyptian Muslims at the Turko-Circassian dominance of high-level Egyptian posts, and many 
Copts felt threatened by the Syrian Christians who, under European encouragement, were 
beginning to fulfill bureaucratic roles traditionally reserved for Copts. That said, the ‘Urabi 
revolt took on unabashedly Islamic and Arab tendencies, and ‘Urabi was not shy to use Islamic 	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rhetoric to rally the masses behind him. Furthermore, unlike most other Egyptian publications, 
which had very nationalist titles, the main ‘Urabi newspapers (al-Ta’if, al-Hijaz, and Fustat) had 
Arab-Islamic titles.118 Also, during the 1881-1882 unrest around the ‘Urabi revolt, Coptic 
landowners in Upper Egypt had problems with their fellahin, sometimes resulting in violence.119 
Regardless of the reality of Coptic opinion regarding the ‘Urabi revolt, British media and 
government sources repeatedly raised the prospect that should ‘Urabi take control of Egypt, the 
Copts would be subject to possible extermination.120 The British cited this potential ethnic 
cleansing as a justification for their invasion of Egypt and expected to receive more gratitude 
from Copts for saving them from impending disaster. Even after 1882, Lord Cromer continued to 
cite potential threats against Copts as a rationale to his superiors for extending and entrenching 
the British occupation of Egypt.121 The Coptic view of the British occupation was always 
somewhat divided into two camps: Copts who supported the British occupation and viewed it as 
an essential safeguard and those Copts who thought that they would be better off in an 
independent Egypt. Over the course of the occupation, the camp that comprised the majority of 
Copts would vary depending on the circumstances of the time.   
 
Continuation of Coptic Reform 
 The beginning of the British occupation of Egypt—and the relative climate of freedom it 
permitted, particularly in the press--further emboldened Coptic reformers to continue their efforts 
as they felt the British, as western Christians, would be sympathetic to Coptic interests. In 
particular, they felt the British would be more inclined to side with liberal, European-influenced 	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Coptic reformers in their conflicts with the traditional clergy, who typified the stubbornness and 
closed-mindedness of the East that the British so detested.  In 1883, the Anglican Church, which 
obviously exercised some influence over the British occupiers in Egypt, formed the Association 
for the Furtherance of Christianity in Egypt, which encouraged the Coptic reformers. The 
purpose of the organization was to “further the cause of Christianity in Egypt by assisting the 
Coptic Church in the attainment of a higher spiritual life, especially through a better system of 
education for its members.”122 
Members of the association met with the reformers and the Patriarch Kyrollos V to 
emphasize the necessity of reform. The new reform movement began on February 6, 1883 when 
Boutros Ghali made a speech demanding the government to order the resumption of meetings of 
the lay council (maglis al-milli).123 The reformers focused their demands on the need to better 
manage Church funds and endowments (waqfs), provide more support to impoverished Copts, 
construct more schools for the general Coptic population, and to mandate a more thorough 
theological education for clergy. On May 14, 1883, Khedive Tawfik issued a decree sanctioning 
the creation of a new lay council in the Coptic Church.124 Patriarch Kyrollos V, however, felt 
that the reformers did not respect his authority and so refused to attend any meetings of the lay 
council, thereby delegitimizing it until its termination in 1884.125 Though the second wave of 
reform, initiated on the coattails of the British occupation, was short-lived, the appetite for 
change among elite lay Copts continued to grow, and in 1891 reformers were once again 
lobbying the Patriarch to give them some supervision over church affairs.   
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In 1891, reformers came together to demand that the Patriarch hold elections for a new 
lay council, and this time, when Kyrollos V refused, they went ahead and held their own 
elections for the council over his objections. The same years, Coptic reformers also created an 
organization called the Jam’iyyat al-tawfiq, an organization intended to help poor and orphaned 
Copts by building schools and hospitals.126 The organization published reports documenting the 
decay of Coptic schools because of a lack of funding from the Church, demanding that the clergy 
receive salaries to end clerical corruption, and advocating for increased lay involvement in 
church affairs. These reports were widely read by lay Copts and expanded popular support for 
reform beyond the previous circle of elite Copts.  
 The newfound enthusiasm of the reformers antagonized Kyrollos V, and he asked 
Khedive Tawfik to abolish the council. The Khedive, old and not wishing to antagonize either 
the Patriarch or the reformers, gave Boutros Ghali, the highest ranking Copt in government at the 
time, the responsibility for finding a solution to this crisis.127 When Boutros Ghali could not 
come up with a solution that pleased both the clergy and the reformers, they decided to hold 
another round of elections for the Council and were able to obtain a Khedivial decree ratifying 
the election results on July 17, 1892.128 After the Patriarch still refused to accept the legitimacy 
of the Council, the reformers asked the Khedive to relieve the Patriarch of his authority over the 
Church’s secular affairs and appoint a bishop as vicar to assume the authority of the Patriarch. 
The Khedive consented to this request, and Kyrollos V responded in the tradition of many Coptic 
patriarchs before him—by appealing to European governments, particularly the French and 
British, to intervene on his behalf. The French and British were quite sympathetic to the 
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reformers, since they were mostly European-educated elites and represented the more 
westernized, “enlightened” trends of the Coptic community, and so neither government agreed to 
intervene on the Patriarch’s behalf. However, the Russians, ever keen to exert their authority in 
the Middle East, threatened the Egyptian government that the czar would exercise his authority 
as the protector of the Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire to intervene on behalf of the Patriarch, 
though the threat was to no avail.129 
 Tensions within the Coptic community rose as a power squabble emerged between 
Kyrollos V and Athanasius, the bishop who was chosen to serve as Patriarchal Vicar and 
president of the Council. Tensions reached a climax when the Council requested that Kyrollos V 
be banished—a request that was granted by Khedivial decree on September 1, 1892.130 The 
banishment provoked much division within the Coptic community, and Athanasius felt obliged 
to resign his position on January 24, 1893 and to ask the government to allow for Kyrollos’ 
return.131 Over the course of these events, Abbas II became the new khedive and the government 
of Mustafa Fahmi, a liberal Anglophile who was sympathetic to the interests of the similarly 
Anglophile Coptic reformers, was replaced by a new government led by Riad Pasha, a more 
conservative Muslim who was less inclined to support the British. For reasons that continue to be 
debated, Riad Pasha was much more sympathetic to the position of Kyrollos V, and he promptly 
published a decree allowing Kyrollos V to return to Cairo to claim the papacy. According to 
Lord Cromer, Riad Pasha sided with the Patriarch because “the staid Moslem [Riad Pasha] was 
shocked at rebellion against legitimate hierarchical authority” and “the Moslem, conscious of his 
own defects, was alarmed at the appearance of a new rival in the shape of a Coptic 
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progressionist.”132 Lord Cromer was quite disappointed at this development as he was 
sympathetic to the Coptic reformers’ cause (he called Kyrollos V “the incarnation of the most 
stupid and obtuse form of conservatism”133), but he was confident of the prospects for Coptic 
reform, saying “ [though] the anti-reformers appear to have triumphed…the triumph is assuredly 
but temporary.”134 
 Lord Cromer would be proven correct. While Kyrollos’ victory may have derailed the 
trajectory of reform, the reformers were still persistent. Of the twelve elected members of the 
Council, seven were beys and one, Boutros Ghali, was a pasha, so the reformists had a great 
degree of social influence within Egypt and a strong educational background.135 The reform 
movement spawned by these gentlemen would have a considerable impact in the Coptic Church. 
Not only was a lay council an essential part of Church affairs in the first half of the 20th century, 
but the emphasis on expanding educational opportunities for Copts and properly managing 
church endowments would eventually be embraced by the clergy. Even Kyrollos V began 
accepting the need for reform. Upon resuming the Patriarchate in 1893, Kyrollos announced the 
construction of new Coptic schools and theological institutions.136 This prioritization of 
education within the Coptic community, always a key demand of the reformers, was the vehicle 
that propelled Copts to the heights of Egyptian society in the early 20th century.  
 
Expansion of Education  
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 As explained earlier, the push for expanded educational opportunities for Copts had 
originated in the mid-19th century and was modeled after the educational activities of Protestant 
and Catholics missionaries all over Egypt. After the reformers reiterated the need for more 
education for lower-class Copts in the 1880s and 1890s, the Church began taking seriously the 
need for more schools. By 1907, there were forty-six Coptic schools in the country. There were 
over 20,000 Coptic students in both religious and government schools, of which over a quarter 
were girls.137 The expansion in Coptic education also coincided (and was partially motivated by) 
an expansion in educational institutions managed by European Catholic orders, American 
Protestant missionaries, and even European governments. Because of the religious nature of 
many of these institutions, Copts were much more likely than Muslims to enroll their children in 
these schools, particularly in Upper Egypt.  
 Italian schools in Egypt, for example, could be classified into two categories: schools in 
Cairo and Alexandria that were generally geared toward expatriates and some wealthy Egyptians 
and the schools in Upper Egypt that were run as missions with religious objectives. In 1927, 
Italian schools in Upper Egypt had about 800 students, both boys and girls, who were almost 
exclusively Copts.138 The Italian schools in Upper Egypt were generally geared towards lower-
middle class Copts, as wealthier Copts preferred to send their children to better-equipped Coptic 
and American schools. One such American school, the American College of Assiut, which was 
run by American Evangelical missionaries, was one of the best educational institutions in Egypt. 
Assiut had a high concentration of Christians, around 1/3 of the province’s population, and these 
Christians were disproportionately well represented among the province’s landowning elite. The 
American College in Assiut had a majority-Christian student population, both Orthodox and 	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Protestant, and graduated many prominent Egyptian Copts, including Makram Ebeid, a future 
nationalist political leader. The school was the jewel of an American missionary education 
system in Egypt that, by 1920, consisted of 181 schools education over 15,000 students.139 While 
American schools in Egypt tended to have an explicit Christian mission and were significantly 
more attended by Copts as opposed to Muslims, the French system in Egypt was less religiously 
oriented and thus had a more diverse student body. French schools in Egypt had over 30,000 
students by 1922140, which included high numbers of students from the country’s expatriate 
communities (Italians, Levantines, Armenians, and Greeks), Jews, and local Muslim and 
Christian students from the upper-middle and upper classes.  Heather Sharkey explains that the 
French schools in Cairo and Alexandria, which were a majority of such schools in Egypt, 
“represented Franco-Catholic cultural outposts in Egypt and pursued educational missions that 
were only incidentally related to the mission of making Copts into Uniates.”141 
 In addition to foreign schools, there were three prestigious government-run schools in 
Egypt that were modeled after the English public school system and had almost exclusively 
European administrators. These schools were the Khidiwiyya and Tawfiqiyya schools in Cairo 
and Ra’s al-Tin school in Alexandria. While all three schools were originally established prior to 
the beginning of the British occupation in 1882, they were all given particular attention by the 
British administrators in Egypt, and became the incubators of Egypt’s elite. By some estimates, 
as many as three-fourths of ministers in Egypt from the 1920s to 1952 graduated from one of 
these schools, including four prime ministers.142 While the schools were very popular among 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  “An	  American	  College	  on	  the	  Nile.”	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  May	  21,	  1922.	  Accessed	  at	  www.nytimes.com	  on	  March	  22,	  2012.	  	  140	  Petricoli,	  181.	  	  141	  Sharkey,	  32.	  	  142	  Donald	  M.	  Reid,	  “Turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Century	  Egyptian	  School	  Days.”	  Comparative	  Education	  Review,	  27.iii.	  (Oct.	  1983),	  375.	  	  
	  	   51	  
local Muslim elites, Copts were overrepresented in the student body as well. On average, Copts 
made up about 22% of the graduates of these government secondary schools between 1898 and 
1912, a figure that is more than double their share of the general Egyptian population.143 Even at 
the college level, Copts were overrepresented at colleges in Egypt, from foreign-run schools like 
the American University in Cairo or Victoria College in Alexandria to government-run 
institutions. For example, the French Law School in Cairo graduating class of 1906 had fourteen 
Copts out of a class of thirty students.144 Many wealthy Coptic families also sent their children to 
complete their university education in Britain and France, which helped further develop the 
language skills of wealthier Copts, eventually setting them up for prominent political careers (as 
was the case with foreign-educated politicians Makram Ebeid, Wasif Ghali, and Wissa Wassef). 
The disproportionately strong educational background of the Coptic community, whether in 
Coptic, foreign, or government schools, helped propel the community forward both culturally 
and economically.  
 
Coptic Cultural Life 
 By the end of the 19th century, Coptic cultural life was rich and fully developed. Two 
prominent Egyptian dailies were directed towards Copts, though both paid attention to issues of 
wider national concern, attracting some Muslim readers and having Muslims on staff. The first 
Coptic daily, Al Watan (The Homeland), was founded in 1878 and consistently backed the clergy 
against reformers in matters of communal reform—for which it received a consistent papal 
subsidy.145 Al Watan supported the British occupation of Egypt well into the 1920s and 
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advocated for Coptic rights, gearing its writing to an older, more traditional, Anglophile 
audience. The more prominent Coptic daily of the time, Misr, was founded in 1895 by a wealthy 
Asyuti reformer who wanted to counterbalance the pro-clerical views of  Al-Watan.146 Misr was 
also initially very pro-British and a vocal defender of Coptic interests against perceived attacks 
in the Muslim press. By 1918, however, the paper followed the lead of several prominent Coptic 
politicians like Makram Ebeid and Wissa Wassef and became vehemently anti-British and pro-
Wafd, eventually becoming an organ of the Wafd party (a move which considerably boosted the 
paper’s circulation and prominence).147 In addition to the two Coptic dailies, Coptic cultural life 
included many magazines and journals, including one, al-Jins al-latif, that targeted females, 
indicating there was a substantial population of literate, educated Coptic women in Egypt at the 
time.148 In 1905, Coptic elites in Cairo also established the Ramses Club, an exclusive club for 
upper class Copts to stimulate cultural appreciation and coordinate the involvement of elite 
Copts in Egyptian political life. The vibrant cultural life of Copts in Egypt in the 1890s through 
the 1930s is also indicative of the considerable financial wealth that Copts had accumulated 
during the time period.   
  
The Expansion of Coptic Wealth 
 As mentioned earlier, an impressive Coptic aristocracy began emerging in the latter half 
of the 19th century made up of Copts with privileged government positions as scribes, 
accountants, and advisers who used their positions and salaries to amass significant landholdings 
in Upper Egypt. By the early 20th century Coptic wealth had only expanded, as these families not 
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only began buying more land but also began acquiring other lucrative assets such as factories and 
buildings in the major cities. The expanded educational opportunities for Copts also provided a 
way for Copts outside the limited number of elite landowning families to begin building their 
own wealth through prominent government positions and extensive involvement in the banking 
and financial sectors in Egypt. A 1907 census of Egypt documented that Copts paid 16% of all 
land taxes in Egypt though they numbered only 7% of the population counted.149 Samir Seikaly 
estimates that once the other capital assets of Copts were added to the equation, the Copts held 
25% of the total wealth of Egypt.150 Seikaly also cites the 1918 government census as a reference 
to estimate that 100,000 Coptic landowners owned around 1.4 million feddans (acres) of 
cultivable land in Egypt151—an extremely large figure, and one that excludes the direct holdings 
of the Coptic Orthodox Church, which were estimated to be 15,000 feddans.152 In addition to 
immense land holdings, Seikaly estimates that Copts, through roles as bankers and financiers, 
were involved in 60% of Egyptian commerce at the time153 and four prominent Copts were 
among the original shareholders of Banque Misr in 1919.154 Copts were also disproportionately 
involved in government work, even beyond their traditional dominance in the finance ministry. 
Adel Beshai, a prominent economist, cites figures from the 1920s and 1930s that show that 
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Copts made up 30% of the workforce in the Ministry of Public Works, 44% in the Ministry of 
Finance, and 48% in the Ministry of Railways and Postal Services.155  
The legal equality, relative security, and economic opportunities offered by the British 
mandate allowed for a cultural and economic boom for Copts in Egypt, which explains why 
Copts tend to refer to the period after 1882 as the “golden age of Coptic history.”156 Education 
for Copts, itself facilitated by European and American missionaries and educators, was a key 
reason for this revival and is an illustration of how essential western involvement in Egypt was in 
the empowerment of Copts in Egyptian society. The American missionary J.R. Alexander 
summarized this effect in 1925, writing that “The Evangelical community, directly and 
indirectly, has made the Coptic community, next to itself, the best educated and most enlightened 
part of the population.”157 This viewpoint was certainly shared by many in the Coptic 
community, who were proud of their community’s achievements in the Egypt of the British 
mandate and who felt that they were in many ways the most enlightened and successful segment 
of the population.  
The accumulation of wealth was an important objective for the Coptic community 
because, in the words of historian Samir Seikaly, “History had taught [the Copts] that wealth 
alone could, and did, save from the cruelties of oppressors.”158 In the self-image of the Copts, 
their success could be traced directly to the success and genius of their ancestors the ancient 
Egyptians. Through the accomplishments of the ancient Egyptians, the influence of ancient 
Egypt on Greco-Roman thought, and the historic contributions of the Copts to the development 
of Christianity, the Copts felt a sense of ownership over western civilization. This accomplished 	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legacy gave many Copts a sense of responsibility to bring Egypt back to the forefront of 
international civilization, to spread western culture in Egypt, and, in short, to “[lead] Egypt to 
progress and advancement.”159 To fulfill this responsibility to Egypt, elite Copts began shifting 
their focus away from personal and communal affairs into a greater participation in national 
politics.  
 
Boutros Ghali Pasha 
 The most famous Coptic politician in Egypt in the beginning of the 20th century was 
surely Boutros Ghali Pasha, who was an influential lay figure within the Coptic community and 
one of the leading proponents of communal reform throughout the last quarter of the 19th 
century, as described earlier in the thesis. Ghali began his career by working as a clerk and 
interpreter in the mixed courts of Egypt, as the foreign language skills he had attained through 
studying at the Great Coptic School were essential to communicating with Europeans in the 
courts. As he rose through the ranks of clerks in the justice ministry, Ghali won the confidence of 
the Europeans for whom he translated and eventually became head clerk in the Justice Ministry 
in 1873.160 In 1876, Ghali was named Egyptian commissioner of the Public Debt Commission 
and then was appointed deputy minister of justice in 1879.161  
Ghali obtained his first cabinet position, that of Finance Minister, in 1893, and then 
served as Foreign Minister from 1894 through his own premiership. Ghali’s most prominent role 
came when he presided over the 1906 Dinshaway Affair- the trial of Egyptian peasants who 
attacked British soldiers after the soldiers shot a local woman during a hunting trip.  Despite 	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substantial public sympathy for the villagers, Ghali approved draconian sentences for the 
peasants on trial. Though this move hurt his public image, it strengthened his already close 
relationship with Khedive Abbas, (1892-1914) since a sympathetic sentence for the villagers 
would have angered the British authorities in Egypt and possibly led them to depose Abbas in 
favor of another family member.162 Thus, when Mustafa Fahmi resigned as prime minister in 
November 1908, it was not surprising that Abbas proposed his trusted friend and experienced 
government official Boutros Ghali Pasha to take Fahmi’s place as prime minister. While the 
Coptic and local British papers were ecstatic about Ghali’s appointment, the opinion in the 
Muslim dailies was more divided. Al-Jarida praised Ghali’s experience, statesmanship, and 
extensive capabilities but most Muslim dailies objected to his appointment on the grounds of his 
staunch support for the British. Only Al-Dustour openly cited his Christianity as grounds to 
oppose his appointment, claiming it implied that there was no Muslim capable of governing the 
predominantly Muslim country.163  
There was barely time for the controversy to settle before Ghali’s tenure was abruptly 
ended when he was assassinated leaving the ministry building on February 20, 1910. The lone 
assassin was Ibrahim al-Wardani, a young Muslim student who had studied in Switzerland. 
Wardani denied any sectarian motives for the attack, saying instead that he assassinated Ghali 
because he viewed him as a traitor for the British, both for his ruling in the Denshawy incident 
and for his supposed support for a plan to extend the British concession over the Suez Canal. 
Wardani was a founding member of a society called Misr, a group of Egyptian students in 
Europe—both Copts and Muslims—that advocated for an independent, democratic Egypt and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  ibid.	  	  163	  Seikaly,	  “Prime	  Minister	  and	  Assassin,”	  117.	  	  
	  	   57	  
was loosely affiliated with the Watani party in Egypt.164 Even though Wardani’s intentions were 
not motivated by sectarianism, the public reaction to his act took on violent sectarian undertones.  
Large segments of the Egyptian population and many Muslim dailies treated Wardani as a hero. 
Some chanted in the streets “Ya mit sabah al-full ‘ala al-Wardani illi qatal Boutros al-Nasrani.” 
(“A	  hundred	  sweet	  mornings	  to	  Wardani	  who	  killed	  Boutros	  the	  Nazarene.”	  )165 Copts were 
understandably furious that the most powerful Copt in recent Egyptian history had been 
assassinated, and the incident only reinforced Coptic support for the British occupation. Coptic 
newspapers that referred to Wardani as a “wicked murderer” were cautioned by the Ministry of 
Interior for fear of aggravating tensions.166 Sectarianism even reached the grand mufti of Egypt, 
who issued a fatwa claiming that the death penalty would not be appropriate for Wardani 
according to Islamic law because his victim was a non-Muslim, revolver wounds were outside 
the scope of Mohammed’s definition of murder, and the punishment was not brought on by a 
member of the victim’s family.167 Wardani was referred to trial and although the public favored 
his pardon and the mufti issued a fatwa considering the death penalty unjustified, Wardani was 
sentenced to death and was hanged on June 28, 1910.168  
Copts were still, however, extremely agitated by the assassination and its aftermath and 
asked the British for permission to hold a conference to discuss Coptic demands, which was 
granted to them. Though many prominent Cairene Copts, such as Wissa Wassef and Wasif 
Boutros Ghali (the son of Boutros Ghali Pasha) opposed the conference for fear of inciting 
further sectarian tensions, the conference, held in March 1911, was well-attended by many 	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prominent Coptic political figures, both Protestant and Orthodox, particularly from the major 
Upper Egyptian families. Among the over 1,000 delegates to the conference were Tawfiq Dus, 
Fakhri Abdel Nour, Murqus Hanna, Sinut Hanna, and George Khayyat.169 The organizers of the 
conference went to great lengths to underplay sectarian overtones, starting the conference with 
the national anthem, proudly displaying the Egyptian flag, and banning any comments of an 
overtly religious nature. The conference’s discussions centered around four explicit concerns: 
that Sunday be a national holiday for Christians, that government posts be allocated by merit 
alone without any religious restrictions, that there be proportional representation for Copts in 
parliament, and that village schools in Egypt be equally open to Muslims, Christians, and 
Jews.170 The conference in Asyut prompted a reaction from some prominent Muslim figures in 
Egypt who decided to host a rival “Egyptian Conference” in Heliopolis in April that considered 
the Asyut conference and its demands to be sectarian. The Organising Committee of the 
Heliopolis Conference accused the Copts of trying to form “a separate nation for themselves” 
and to “concentrate all power in Coptic hands…by relying on the fact that the occupying power 
is Christian.”171 The congress also entertained a motion calling for an investigation into the 
excessive number of Copts in the civil service and in government schools.172 Overall, however, 
the conference concluded with a call for national unity, and the tensions that flared immediately 
after the assassination of Ghali slowly began to dissipate.  
Nevertheless, there was a general aura of suspicion surrounding the motives of Copts in 
attaining political power, particularly regarding their perceived loyalty to the British and their 	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suspected desire to assure their dominance in Egyptian government positions. These suspicions 
made it difficult for pro-British Copts to pursue national political aims, despite the fact that 
British occupation was still supported by the majority of Copts, including some established 
families and the major Coptic publications. The emerging nationalist movement and the 
acknowledged need for national unity in presenting the case for an independent Egypt created an 
opening for nationalist Coptic politicians. These nationalist Copts, including the scions of the 
most prominent Coptic families in Egypt, would fill the void in Coptic political life left by 
Ghali’s assassination through their involvement in the movement for Egyptian independence.  
 
Copts and the Formation of the Wafd 
 
 World War One brought a period of economic depression to Egypt that furthered anti-
British sentiment among all Egyptian, Muslims or Christians. This, coupled with a perception 
among some Copts that the British had favored Syrians and Armenians for high-level 
government positions at the expense of Copts, contributed to a re-evaluation of support for the 
British among many Copts.173 Even Lord Cromer acknowledged that Coptic support for the 
British was weak because the Copts had expected that the British, as Christian powers, would 
have favored them, and that they felt slighted by the lack of British support.174 While discussions 
about creating a strong movement for independence began in 1917, Copts did not partake in the 
discussions until late 1918, when Sinut Hanna, a Copt from a wealthy Beni Sueif family, joined 
the Wafdist camp led by the prominent nationalist parliamentarian Saad Zaghloul.175  
The Western education and connection to Europe among Copts became a useful asset for 
the Wafdists, and most of the Copts who joined were sought for their foreign language skills and 	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ability to advocate for Egyptian independence in European circles. The next Copt to join the 
Wafd was George Khayyat, scion of a wealthy Coptic Protestant family in Asyut who was 
educated in American schools and served as the American Consul in Asyut.176 Wafdist leaders 
felt that Khayyat was in a unique position to influence American opinion to endorse Egyptian 
independence. Ironically, Wasif Boutros Ghali, whose father was perceived by many Egyptians 
to be quite supportive of the British occupation, was the next Copt to join the Wafd. Wasif Ghali 
was a Francophile who had attended French Jesuit schools in Egypt, completed his law school 
education in France, and lived in Paris for many years as a professor of Arabic literature at the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales.177 Ghali had written many nationalist articles for the French 
press in Egypt and would serve as the de facto representative of the Wafd to France, charged 
with securing French support for Egyptian independence. Wissa Wassef was the next prominent 
Copt to join the Wafd. Wassef, who had been the first Copt to join Mustafa Kamel’s Watani 
party in 1906, had completed his secondary and post-secondary education in France, and was 
also found to be extremely useful in communicating the Wafdist position to the French.178 Due to 
the foreign language skills of the Wafdist Copts, it is unsurprising that all of them (Ghali, 
Wassef, Hanna, and Khayyat) traveled with Saad Zaghloul to advocate for Egyptian 
independence at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, making the delegation there majority 
Coptic. 179  
Back in Cairo, the Wafdist Central Committee had recruited many new Coptic members. 
The most prominent among them was Makram Ebeid, the scion of a prominent Coptic family (he 	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was a descendant of Jirjis al-Jahwari) who had been educated at the American College in Asyut 
and then studied law at Oxford University and Egyptology in France.180 Makram Ebeid had some 
nationalist tendencies—he retained his membership in the Coptic Orthodox Church even after his 
father converted to Protestantism and dropped his given first name “William” in an attempt to 
seem less Westernized to the Egyptian public. The Wafd had long targeted Ebeid as a valuable 
addition to their leadership because of his ability to communicate and connect with the British.  
 After a wave of Coptic politicians joined the Wafd, support for Egyptian independence 
became widespread among Copts.  While Al-Watan and a few prominent politicians like Marqus 
Simaika still supported the British occupation, Misr had changed its tune and began adamantly 
supporting the Wafd and staunchly opposing the British presence in Egypt. Furthermore, Copts 
became active participants in provincial Wafdist committees all over Egypt—even making up a 
majority of the committee in Asyut.181 The active involvement of both Muslims and Copts in the 
fight for independence created a spirit of brotherhood and harmony between the two groups that 
had never been seen before, and that would last well into the 1920s. Coptic priests and Muslim 
sheikhs would jointly lead independence rallies, and the Wafd’s cross-and-crescent symbol 
featured prominently in all the rallies, becoming a beloved symbol of national unity. The Mufti 
of Egypt visited the Patriarch for Eastern and other prominent feats, and the Patriarch 
reciprocated the visits. Famously, Father Murqus Sergius, a firebrand Coptic priest who vocally 
supported Egyptian independence, led a rally to al-Azhar and was even allowed to speak from 
the pulpit—a tremendous sign of the harmony and trust that existed between the two 
communities at the time as they united against the British occupation.  	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Youssef Wahba Pasha 
 Unsurprisingly, the British were not too pleased about the massive popularity of the Wafd 
among both Copts and Muslims. One British observer at the time viewed Coptic support for the 
Wafd as “another instance of the desertion of a natural ally in our time of need.”182 When 
Mohammed Sa’id resigned from his post as prime minister in November 1919 under British 
pressure following a string of sniper attacks on British soldiers in Cairo, the British saw an 
opportunity to weaken the Wafd through the nomination of the next prime minister.183 In an 
attempt to weaken Coptic support for independence and drive a wedge between Muslims and 
Christians, the British decided to push for the appointment of a Copt, the finance minister 
Youssef Wahba, to be the next prime minister. Copts were immediately concerned that Wahba’s 
acceptance of the premiership would end the harmony that existed between Copts and Muslims 
and incite sectarian tensions. Over 2,000 concerned Copts assembled at the Cathedral of Saint 
Mark where prominent Coptic politicians vocalized their disapproval of Wahba’s selection and 
stressed the importance of national unity.184 Prominent Muslim politicians like Abd al-Rahman 
Fahmi, Secretary-General of the Wafd, also assured Copts that Wahba’s acceptance of the post 
would not harm Coptic-Muslim relations as the Muslims who agreed to form a cabinet with him 
were just as guilty of treason. The Deputy Patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church even sent a 
telegram to Wahba asking him not to accept the post on behalf of the over 2,000 Copts who 
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attended the meeting at Saint Mark’s Cathedral.185 When Wahba went ahead and formed a 
Cabinet on November 21, he had very little support among Copts.  
 A few weeks later, on December 15, 1919, an assassination attempt was made on 
Wahba’s life when a young Coptic medical student named ‘Iryan Yusuf Sa’d threw a bomb at his 
carriage. Sa’d was reportedly a member of the Black Hand, a secret society tenuously linked to 
the Wafd party, and he had volunteered to carry out the act in order to avoid the sectarian 
tensions that would have inevitably flared had a Muslim assassinated another Coptic prime 
minister.186 Sa’d was apparently pleased that Wahba had escaped unharmed from the event, 
claiming that his intention was only to scare Wahba in order to encourage a resignation.187 Prime 
Minister Wahba refused to submit to the act of terror and stayed on as prime minister until a 
series of assassination attempts on his cabinet members in early 1920 prompted him to finally 
resign on May 19, 1920.  The Wafd had little time to be pleased with the success of their policy 
of intimidation, as divisions within the nationalist camp soon began to surface over whether 
negotiations with the British should be led by Prime Minister Adli Pasha or Sa’ad Zaghloul.188 
 In the spring of 1921, the division in the nationalist camp came to a head when most 
members of the Wafd, bothered by Zaghloul’s insistence that he lead negotiations with the 
British, decided to desert him and support Adli instead. The only original members of the Wafd 
to remain loyal to Zaghloul were three Copts—Hanna, Ghali, and Wassef—and the Wafd post-
division became even more visibly Coptic than it had been before.189 When Adli’s negotiations 
with the British collapsed in November 1921, prompting his resignation, the Wafd again became 
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the leading advocates for an independent Egypt. The British responded by exiling Zaghloul and 
two of his Coptic colleagues, Ebeid and Hanna, a move which only prompted more of the 
members that had joined Adli’s faction to return to the Wafd.190 
 
Negotiating Independence and Writing the Constitution 
 After the exile of the Wafdist leaders, the British realized that they had no other credible 
Egyptian interlocutors with whom to negotiation Egyptian independence. Seeing the writing on 
the wall and recognizing that public opinion in Egypt was firmly behind independence, the 
British unilaterally granted independence to Egypt in February 1922. The fight for independence, 
however, was not over, as negotiations between the British, the monarchy, and Egyptian 
nationalists would continue for the following twenty years in order to finalize the details of the 
treaty of independence. No issue regarding independence was as contentious and controversial as 
the third reserved point in the 1922 independence treaty offered by the British to Egypt, which 
gave Britain the right to intervene in Egyptian affairs in order to protect minorities191 At the time, 
leading Copts, including even the traditional al-Watan newspaper, adamantly condemned the 
reserved point, arguing that accepting such conditions would be tantamount to considering Copts 
a foreign community within Egypt. While staunch opposition forced the British to drop this 
reserved point, the British still insisted that a clause holding the Egyptian government 
responsible for the protection and equal treatment of minorities in Egypt be included in the final 
treaty. Leading Copts, including Makram Ebeid and Wasif Boutros Ghali, opposed any mention 
of minorities whatsoever in the independence treaty as they opposed making any distinction 
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between Copts and Muslims and feared that clauses affirming minority rights would create a 
perception that Copts were affiliated with foreign interests and sought foreign protections.192  
The independence treaty would go through several iterations until a new treaty was 
signed in 1936 that omitted any reference to minorities. After the new treaty was signed, the 
British decided to advocate for minority rights by pressuring the Egyptian government to 
voluntarily make a statement regarding minority rights as part of its application for admission to 
the League of Nations—though this, too, was opposed by Ebeid and the Wafd.193 Negotiations 
on revising the treaty of independence would continue through the 1940s, though none 
succeeded and the 1936 treaty held until the 1952 revolution that definitively ended both the 
monarchy and the British presence in Egypt.  
 Issues of minority rights were also an important factor in the drafting of Egypt’s 
Constitution in April 1922 following the British proclamation of an independent Egypt. The 
Constitution Committee included three Copts and sought a constitution modeled after the 
Belgian constitution, as Belgium was a modern European country that had managed to avoid 
major sectarian problems despite being home to different ethnic groups.194 None of the Christian 
members of the Constitutional Committee opposed the provision making Islam the religion of 
state, as the climate of Muslim-Christian harmony following the 1919 Revolution had persisted 
and few prominent Copts felt that the enshrinement of Islam as a state religion would ever have 
any negative effects on religious minorities in Egypt. Furthermore, Coptic leaders were probably 
well aware that Islam had been intrinsically linked with the Egyptian state since the Arab 
invasion in the 7th century, and they realized that arguing over the place of Islam in Egypt would 
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not be in their best interest and could incite sectarian tensions. Some Coptic thinkers even made 
statements endorsing the provision making Islam the religion of state, such as Makram Ebeid’s 
famous statement that he was a Muslim by country and a Christian by religion.195 In any case, 
concerns about any discrimination resulting from having a state religion were solved by the 
inclusion of constitutional safeguards of civil and political equality for all Egyptians in Articles 
1, 12, and 13 of the constitution.196 
 More debate in the committee centered around a proposal by the Coptic politician Tewfik 
Doss Pacha to have guaranteed proportional representation for minorities in Egypt’s constitution, 
with Doss suggesting that 20% of seats in Parliament be reserved for minorities.197 Tewfik Doss 
was unique among prominent Coptic politicians at the time because he was not a member of the 
Wafd, but rather a member of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, which tended to have more 
Muslim members and be more closely affiliated with the monarchy. His proposal, however, did 
have the support of Youssef Qattawi Pasha, a prominent Egyptian Jew who was also on the 
Constitutional Committee, and Bishop Yuanis, a representative of the Coptic Orthodox 
Church.198 Saad Zaghloul opposed this measure because he believed that Parliament should not 
be divided along ethnic or religious lines, and all Wafdist Copts supported this view. The 
Wafdist Copts wished to avoid any consideration of Copts as minorities, or somehow different 
from the rest of Egyptian society, and they felt that a representative quota was unnecessary 
because enough Copts would get elected to Parliament anyway. While al-Watan and the 
Patriarchate supported Doss’s position, Misr and the Coptic Wafdists enthusiastically denounced 
the provision, decrying the provisions’ implication that there would be any legal separation 	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between Muslims and non-Muslims. In the view of the Wafdist Copts, there was no such thing as 
a Christian minority in Egypt as there was no difference between the identity of a Muslim and of 
a Copt—they were all simply Egyptian.199 With the secular forces of Egyptian politics uniting 
against the provision, Doss’s proposal was turned down in a fifteen to seven vote. The 
constitutional debate was soon over, with a modern Egyptian constitution setting the stage for an 
era of free parliamentary elections and civil and political equality for all Egyptians.  
 
 
Copts in a Liberal Egypt 
 The Wafd soon shifted its attention to cementing political power in the coming 
democratic elections. Coptic participation in the Wafd following Egyptian independence was 
higher than ever. The 1923 Wafd executive committee, charged with preparing for the party’s 
electoral campaigns, consisted of six Copts out of fourteen total members.200 The Wafd carried 
the first free parliamentary elections in Egypt in 1924 by a wide margin—a victory which 
vindicated the Wafdist Copts who had opposed a parliamentary quota for minorities since the 
sixteen Copts elected to Parliament comprised around 7.5% of the seats in Parliament, which was 
somewhat higher than the Coptic share of the population in the 1917 census, which was less than 
7%.201 Saad Zaghloul, who was the newly elected prime minister, dispensed with the tradition of 
naming only one Copt to the cabinet by giving two cabinet positions to Copts—Wasif Boutros 
Ghali as foreign minister and Murqus Hanna as minister of public works.202 The trend of 
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governments, while other parties tended to nominate only one Coptic minister whenever they 
gained control of government.  
Coptic representation in Parliament and government was intrinsically linked to the 
electoral success of the Wafd party. Only the Wafd had the popular support and electoral 
strength to get Copts elected in overwhelmingly Muslim districts. The elections of 1929, 1936, 
and 1942—all of which saw overwhelming Wafdist victories—brought over twenty Copts to the 
lower house of Parliament, giving them about a 9% share of the seats in Parliament.203 Copts 
fared even better in the Senate, where 40% of the seats were appointed and membership was 
limited to the wealthy. From 1931, when they made up 15% of the Senate, to 1946, Copts 
comprised over 10% of the Senate, though over 57% of Coptic Senators were appointed rather 
than elected.204 Hasan attributes the success of Christian politicians during this era to “an entire 
generation of upper-class politicians, educated abroad or at the French Law School in Egypt, 
who were imbued with the European ideal of a separation of state and church,” reiterating the 
importance of European influence on Coptic empowerment in liberal Egypt.205  
 Despite the success of the Wafd at placing Copts in positions of political power, the 
Muslim-Christian harmony created by the 1919 revolution did not last long in a climate of 
electoral competition, particularly after Makram Ebeid became Secretary-General of the Wafd 
following Zaghloul’s death in 1927. The main rival to the Wafd was the Liberal Constitutionalist 
party, led by secular elite Muslims with close ties to the monarchy. Through its publications, el-
Siyasa and el-Kashkul, the Liberal Constitutionalist party frequently used sectarianism as a 
political tactic by claiming that the Wafd was dominated by Copts and was being used as a tool 
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in a Coptic conspiracy to control Egypt.206 Though the portrayal of the Wafd as a Coptic party 
pursuing Coptic interests had been used a ploy by the Liberal Constitutionalists as early as 1923, 
the propaganda gained a specific target after Ebeid acceded to a leadership role in the party 
second only to that of Mustafa El-Nahhas, who was portrayed as subservient to Ebeid by the 
rival press.207  Wissa Wassef’s election to president of the lower chamber of Parliament in 1930 
was cited by the Wafd as a public repudiation of the Liberals’sectarian attacks; however, 
sectarian attacks persisted through the 1930s, often taking on anti-Semitic memes as Arabs in 
Palestine began revolting against Jewish immigration and the British occupation. El-Siyasa even 
went so far as to suggest that Wafdist Copts were following the lead of Zionist Jews in Palestine 
and sought the establishment of a separate Coptic homeland in Egypt.208 The Liberals were 
supported by the Palace, which sought to frame the 1938 elections as a competition between the 
Coptic-dominated Wafd and the pious and popular King Farouk, leading to a significant electoral 
defeat for the Wafd that year.209  
 The level of anti-Coptic propaganda during electoral campaigns eventually alarmed the 
British authorities in Egypt, despite contraventions on British intervention on behalf of 
minorities in the treaty of independence. The British ambassador in Egypt intervened to express 
concern about anti-Coptic propaganda in the elections of 1938, 1943, and 1949.210 British 
intervention surfaced in other areas as well, as the British, under pressure from their own 
Anglican missionaries in Egypt, even contemplated forcing the Egyptian government to provide 
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religious instruction to Christian students in government schools in 1933.211 The British in Egypt 
seem to have had some appetite for intervening on behalf of the Copts despite the near-universal 
opposition to any clause affirming minority protections in Egypt’s independence treaties. Sir 
Percy Loraine, the High Commissioner for Egypt at the time, responded to the concerns of an 
Anglican bishop traveling in Egypt in 1932 by saying “I am always prepared to intervene in the 
interests of the Coptic Church as a whole.”212 
 While Wafd leaders, whether Muslim or Christian, responded to these attacks by 
reiterating the importance of national unity, Coptic patience was beginning to wear thin. 
Throughout the 1930s, Misr was publishing articles criticizing discrimination against Copts in 
universities and government ministries, though only when the Wafd was not in power.213  
Makram Ebeid’s 1942 defection from the Wafd following a personal dispute with Mustafa El-
Nahhas about ministerial assignments also amplified Coptic fears. The Wafd went to great 
lengths to retain Coptic support, adding three Copts to its executive committee and publicly 
stating that the feud between Nahhas and Ebeid was not sectarian and that the party was as 
committed as ever to Saad Zaghloul’s principles of equality.214 Ebeid’s formation of el-Kotla el-
Wafdiyya, which was backed by the monarchy in an effort to undermine the Wafd, still managed 
to successfully divide the political allegiances of Copts and thus led to a sharp decline in Coptic 
representation in parliament, though the Wafd retained Kamel Sidqi as Finance Minister.215  
The 1940s also saw an extraordinary rise in the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which engaged in populist rhetoric against Copts and foreigners and again reiterated claims that 	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the Copts were disproportionately powerful in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood’s rhetoric 
amplified sectarian tensions and sparked several incidents of sectarian-motivated violence, 
notably attacks on churches in Zagazig and Cairo in 1946 and 1947.216 The decline in Coptic 
political influence and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood disconcerted Copts, many of whom 
felt that their security was best maintained through an extended British presence in Egypt. Misr, 
once a champion of Egyptian independence in the 1920s, became vocally pro-British in 1946, 
insisting that any revision to the treaty with the British contain a clause affirming the protection 
of minority rights and criticizing Makram Ebeid for facilitating a withdrawal of British troops 
from Egypt.217 As early as 1935, Fr. Sergius, the priest who once preached against the British 
occupation in Al-Azhar, publicly claimed that Copts would be better served if the British stayed 
in Egypt.218 The rising tide of anti-Zionist opinion in Egypt also made Copts uncomfortable, as 
many Muslim Brotherhood members openly accused the Copts of sympathizing with the Jews in 
Palestine.219 
 The “golden age”220 of Coptic wealth and political power would end definitively in 
1952—a year that began with a mob attack on a Coptic church and school in Suez that killed 
three Copts suspected of being British spies.221 When the Free Officers deposed King Farouk on 
July 26, 1952, Egypt’s experiment with liberal democracy was put to a harsh end. Authoritarian 
military rulers in Egypt would suppress any form of political expression, effectively ending 
participation in national politics for all Egyptians and stifling the vibrant Coptic press. Nasser’s 	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subsequent nationalization and land reform policies disproportionately affected Copts, as they 
made up a disproportionate share of the country’s landowning elite.222 These policies not only 
affected the financial status of Copts in Egypt but also reduced Coptic influence on Egyptian 
society since most of the major Coptic political figures in Egypt had belonged to the elite Coptic 
landowning families. While Nasser’s secularism and opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood 
comforted Copts who had feared the rise of Islamism, his Arabism marginalized Copts who felt a 
much deeper attachment to Taha Hussein’s Pharaonist ideals of pre-Arab Egyptian nationalism 
than any affinity with a wider Arab identity, which would always be linked in some way to 
Islam. Egyptian culture and society during Nasser’s reign remained predominantly secular and 
westernized, and relations between Copts and Muslims were quite harmonious, both united by a 
secular nationalism and a sustained war effort that included all Egyptians. After Nasser’s reign, 
however, Egyptian society would become increasingly radicalized due to a variety of external 
and internal socio-economic factors. Ironically, the independent Egypt that had long been a 
dream of Copts from Mu’allim Ya’qub to Makram Ebeid would be more detrimental to the 
community and its status in Egyptian society than the previous one hundred and fifty years under 
a royal dynasty of foreign extraction.  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The history of European intervention in Egypt on behalf of Copts is a long one, stretching 
back to the 16th century, when Coptic Patriarchs entered into negotiations with Catholic 
authorities regarding unification with Rome. Clearly, Coptic authorities at the time felt more 	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confident in having their protection assured by foreign Christian powers than relying on the 
charity of the Egyptian state, which at the time was an Ottoman province. The willingness of 
European powers, whether France or Austria-Hungary or Russia, to exert itself into Ottoman 
affairs by claiming protection over Ottoman religious minorities shows that there was a desire on 
the part of European governments to use their political capital on behalf of their coreligionists in 
the Middle East. The most direct and blatant evidence of the benefits to Copts of European 
intervention in Egypt was Napoleon’s decision to overturn all the Ottoman dhimmi laws limiting 
Coptic rights when he began his occupation of Egypt in 1798. Napoleon even appointed a Copt, 
Jirjis al-Jawhari, to a position of executive power in Egypt. It would be difficult to overstate just 
how much of an impact Napoleon’s decisions had on the status of Christians in Egypt. In less 
than a year, Copts had gone from being forbidden to dress as they please, bear arms, or even 
worship publicly, to governing Egypt, raising an army, building a new cathedral, and living with 
all the basic rights and opportunities assured by the tenets of the French revolution. Even though 
Napoleon’s reign was short-lived, the subsequent rule of the Mohammad Ali dynasty only helped 
propel the Copts further in Egyptian society.  
 The Mohammad Ali dynasty was marked by religious tolerance and relative equality for 
most religious minorities in Egypt. Mohammad Ali continued the mameluke practice of hiring 
Copts as financial advisers and scribes due to their accounting system and higher literacy rates. 
As Mohammad Ali and his successors expanded the Egyptian state to build a modern nation on 
the European model, they expanded the bureaucracy of government as well, creating a need for 
even more Copts to fill government positions that gave them a degree of influence and wealth. 
This wealth was then reinvested in land acquisitions, particularly in Upper Egypt, to build a 
sizable class of Coptic elites. Even though Mohammad Ali was a Muslim of Albanian extraction, 
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many of the gains experienced by Copts over the 19th century could be attributed, at least 
indirectly, to European intervention or the prospect of it. Mohammad Ali and his successors, 
particularly Khedive Isma’il, were keen to portray Egypt as a modern nation to Europe, and thus 
were incentivized to not only afford Copts the rights expected by the Europeans, but to also 
promote Copts to positions of power. Thus, by 1857, when Sa’id Pasha officially proclaimed the 
legal equality of all citizens, all the dhimmi restrictions on Coptic rights had effectively been 
lifted. The friendliness of the Mohammad Ali dynasty to European interest also saw an 
expansion in missionary activity by Catholic missionaries, generally French, and Protestant 
missionaries from America and Britain.  
These missionaries opened schools all over Egypt that, due to the religious nature of the 
curriculum, attracted more Copts than Muslims and thus contributed to solidifying the 
educational advantage that Copts had over their Muslim compatriots. The expansion of 
missionary activity among Copts in Egypt placed increased pressure on the Coptic Church to 
reform, manage its significant endowments more properly, and invest more in the education of 
Copts. Patriarch Kyrollos IV opened the Great Coptic School in Cairo in 1855, and even built 
schools for girls and a theological college. Throughout the last quarter of the 19th century, 
wealthy (and often European-educated) Coptic laypeople pursued a reform movement within the 
Church that succeeded in getting the Patriarchate to invest more resources in Coptic education. 
By the beginning of the 20th century, Coptic students had many well-equipped Coptic schools all 
over Egypt to choose from and were still overrepresented in both government schools and the 
European missionary schools.  
 This educational advantage enjoyed by Copts was a direct result of European missionary 
intervention in Egypt, and this advantage led to an accumulation of financial wealth for many 
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Copts that gave them disproportionate influence in the Egyptian economy. The early 20th century 
saw the Copts parlay this financial influence into political involvement, beginning with the 
illustrious career of Boutros Ghali Pasha, the first Coptic Prime Minister, into the domination of 
Parliament by the pro-independence Wafd party during the liberal democratic period in Egypt 
from 1922 to World War II. The Wafd, as its critics would never shy away from expressing, was 
dominated by Coptic members, most of whom had initially been recruited because their foreign 
language skills—honed at foreign missionary schools in Egypt and then universities in France 
and Britain—were useful in promoting the cause of Egyptian independence to European powers. 
The Wafd was the vehicle through which Copts attained proportionate representation in 
Parliament, two ministerial positions in most cabinets of the time, and other prominent positions 
in Egyptian government. European intervention was also a major factor in the ability of Copts to 
advance in politics through the Wafd. The presence of European schools in Egypt not only gave 
a disproportionate number of Copts foreign language skills that were valued in political and 
diplomatic posts, but it also created an imprint of western culture in Egypt that affected both 
Muslims and Copts and encouraged those who had the means to complete their university 
education in Europe.  
The absorption of European cultural values, particularly secularism, by Egyptian Muslim 
students studying in Europe or at European schools in Egypt was essential in enabling Copts to 
succeed. Most prominent Egyptian Muslim political figures of the time, notably Sa’ad Zaghloul 
and Mostafa El-Nahhas, firmly believed in equality for all Egyptians and made efforts to include 
the Copts in Egyptian politics as much as possible. Furthermore, the most popular trend of 
Egyptian nationalism of the time was a blend of Pharaonism and Mediterraneanism promoted by 
certain Muslim scholars like Taha Hussein, which traced Egypt’s glories to its pre-Islamic 
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civilization and connections with Europe—a philosophy that resonated well with Copts and 
enforced a healthy Egyptian nationalism that was not predicated on Islam. Finally, many political 
gains made by Copts came as a result of brave anti-British positions taken by some of the 
prominent Wafdist Copts in 1919 that endeared them to the Egyptian masses and ushered in a 
few years of Christian-Muslim harmony in Egypt. The role of the British as a foreign enemy to 
unite against was essential to creating this harmony. Thus, the British occupation of Egypt was 
indirectly responsible for the popularity enjoyed by Wafdist Copts—popularity that translated 
into electoral success and then political power. That the age of the British Occupation is 
considered by many Copts to be a Coptic “golden age” demonstrates the positive impact 
European intervention had on Copts.   
 Clearly, European intervention and influence in Egypt, at least indirectly, empowered 
Copts economically and politically in the 19th and early 20th centuries. While some critics may 
argue that Coptic appeals to foreign intervention were signs of disloyalty, an examination of the 
history will reveal that this is not true. Firstly, most European support for Christians in Egypt 
was implicit or indirect, taking the form of educational opportunities and subtle pressures, and 
Copts very rarely called outright for European governments to intervene on their behalf. More 
often than not, European intervention in Egypt on behalf of Christians was unsolicited. One 
notable exception to this rule came during Napoleon’s occupation, when Copts took advantage of 
a rare opportunity to liberate themselves from several centuries of living as second-class citizens 
under Islamic rule. Even then, Copts merely preferred equality under a benign French occupation 
to subjugation under an oppressive Ottoman occupation.  
Furthermore, there was never a uniform position among Copts regarding interaction with 
foreign powers. Just as Copts in the early 20th century were divided between those who 
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supported the Wafd and those who supported the British Occupation, today some Copts support 
seeking international pressure on the Egyptian government to address Coptic grievances while 
other Copts oppose it.223 In today’s globalized world, local issues can quickly capture the world’s 
attention and religious and political freedoms are viewed as increasingly essential. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that Copts, like Kurds, Syrian Christians, Arab Shi’ites, and other marginalized 
minorities, should find their concerns spotlighted by sympathetic activists and government 
officials in the West. In any case, Copts have always professed a deep attachment to a national 
conception of Egypt, from Mu’allim Ya’qub’s first plans for an independent Egypt to Makram 
Ebeid’s fierce resistance to British control in Egypt, often with the aid and support of Muslim 
allies. Taha Hussein’s Pharaonism, an ideology borne out of his education in France that views 
Egyptians as having a unique ethnic identity strongly tied to the rest of the Mediterranean, has 
always been widely embraced by Copts and demands a deep reverence for Egypt and its 
history.224  
 Because European influence in Egypt had been so beneficial to Copts historically, there is 
a deep appreciation for western culture and diplomatic power among many Copts and other 
Eastern Christians who benefited from similar acts of European intervention and influence. Even 
today, the United States and European powers, particularly France, acknowledge a historical role 
in protecting Eastern Christian communities in the Middle East, Copts included. French Foreign 
Minister Alain Juppé reiterated the commitment of the French government to protecting Eastern 
Christians in a column in La Croix, a French Catholic magazine, on February 28, 2012. Juppé 
said,  	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  Internationalization	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“Depuis	  des	  siècles,	  la	  France	  est	  investie	  d’une	  mission	  particulière	  à	  l’égard	  des	  chrétiens	  d’Orient.	  Elle	  ne	  s’y	  dérobera	  pas….	  Notre	  vision	  est	  claire	  :	  il	  ne	  peut	  y	  avoir	  de	  révolution	  démocratique	  authentique	  sans	  protection	  des	  personnes	  appartenant	  aux	  minorités.	  Les	  chrétiens	  d’Orient	  ont	  vocation	  à	  rester	  dans	  leur	  région..	  .En	  Egypte,	  les	  coptes	  occupent	  une	  place	  particulière,	  enracinés	  dans	  la	  longue	  histoire	  du	  pays…	  Si	  des	  interrogations	  persistent	  sur	  l’avenir,	  je	  veux	  dire	  aux	  chrétiens	  d’Orient…que	  la	  France	  ne	  les	  abandonnera	  pas…	  Le	  message	  que	  je	  souhaitais	  leur	  adresser	  est	  simple:	  la	  France	  a	  été,	  et	  est	  restera	  à	  vos	  côtés.”225	  As	  Copts	  enter	  a	  period	  of	  unstable	  democratic	  transition	  and	  probable	  Islamist	  rule,	  these	  strong	  words	  from	  a	  friend,	  rooted	  in	  centuries	  of	  supportive	  history,	  will	  certainly	  be	  appreciated. 
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